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Summary 
In the 1980s, Latin American countries began to implement a set of tax reforms inspired in large part by 
the international financial institutions and ideas associated with the Washington Consensus. These reforms 
involved above all the simplification of tax structures and the removal of exemptions and special 
privileges; the replacement of trade taxes by value-added taxes; and an emphasis on improved tax 
administration. Although not fully implemented, these reforms have generally been useful. However, they 
have come at a price: other issues have been driven and kept off the tax policy agenda. The excluded 
issues include considerations of equity and redistribution; and a serious concern for governance questions 
– the interactions between tax policy and the legitimacy of governments and the policies they pursue. In a 
rather quieter way, many Latin American governments recently have initiated a series of “indigenous” tax 
reforms. These owe little to the support or urging of international financial institutions, are designed to 
deal with particular local problems, begin to address some of the more important political dimensions of 
tax reform, and have been modestly successful. These indigenous reforms provide a basis on which Latin 
American countries could build a more wide-ranging programme of tax reform tailored to regional and 
national circumstances. Such a programme could and should focus more on the political and governance 
dimensions of taxation and attempt to build something resembling national “social contracts” around 
issues of public revenue and expenditure. 
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Introduction 
The 1990s have been a period of rapid fiscal adjustment in much of Latin America. There is a wealth of 
published analysis and evaluation of the expenditure cuts that contributed to adjustment, but far less 
material on the taxation side of the ledger. This report reviews the literature and ideas about tax reform in 
Latin American countries, with a specific focus on the impact of reform on poverty reduction, social 
inclusion and governance capacity. 
Over the past two decades, tax reform in Latin American countries has been guided mostly by 
foreign experts and international financial institutions (IFIs), whose policy advice has been influenced by 
development policy practices as well as debates in industrial countries (Goode 1993; Stewart 2002). The 
IFIs have promoted a fairly homogenous set of tax reforms, often as a pre-requisite for the disbursement 
of loans and in concert with structural adjustment programmes. The reforms have been intended in 
particular to increase governments’ tax takes (i.e. the proportion of GDP taken as tax revenue); to make 
tax systems more neutral in a microeconomic sense; and to make them more compatible with the demands 
for marketisation, trade integration and financial liberalisation (Perry and Herrera 1994; IDB 1996; 
CEPAL 1998; Shome 1999). More recent reforms have paid more attention to administrative and 
governance issues (Barbone et al. 1999) – although we will argue that a new conception of taxation and the 
social contract is necessary if such reforms are to be effective. 
Although the reform packages have been basically similar from country to country, there have been 
significant variations in implementation and effectiveness. Domestic politics, socio-economic structures, 
and the institutional idiosyncrasies of individual countries have shaped the way the reform agenda has 
been translated into actual changes in the tax system. This paper deals especially with the political 
conditions that shape tax reforms, structures and performance in Latin America. It is organised in six 
main sections: 
 
• In Section 1 we review the normative principles and theoretical approaches that underlie most Latin 
American taxation discussions and reform proposals. 
• We survey the main characteristics of Latin American tax systems in Section 2, presenting first some 
stylised general characteristics, and then some of the variations and idiosyncrasies found in the 
region. 
• The substance of post-1980s tax reform in Latin America is presented in Section 3. Framed by the 
previous theoretical and descriptive discussions, this section reviews the common features of the tax 
reform packages that have been prescribed in the region, and their underlying rationale. We also look 
at the role played by IFIs in the design and implementation of reform. 
• In Section 4 we survey the literature that evaluates the tax reform process in Latin America in terms 
of the effectiveness of implementation and the impact on economic growth and poverty reduction.  
viii 
• Section 5 summarises the most important innovations and institutional reforms in Latin American 
taxation. Particular attention is devoted to the identification of reform proposals that are inherently 
Latin American in the sense that they reflect structural, institutional and historical characteristics that 
are peculiar to Latin American countries. We also highlight the role that distributive and institution-
building concerns played in reform design. 
• Our conclusion in Section 6 identifies the main policy lessons. 
 
1 
1  Contrasting approaches to tax reform  
Taxation is pivotal to development. It affects economic performance by altering individuals’ incentives to 
work, save and consume and by influencing businesses’ investment, location and hiring choices. It sets the 
potential for public sector performance by providing the resources required for the provision of essential 
public goods and services, for the funding of social insurance programmes and for the repayment of 
public debt.1 Last but not least, taxation shapes the participation of civil society and the accountability of 
political institutions by engaging – or by failing to engage – voters, politicians and bureaucrats in the 
debate and oversight of government. Where this engagement is effective, state and society institutionalise 
an exchange of tax resources for representation and citizenship. This exchange lies at the heart of a social 
contract, and it is thin or absent for most people in Latin America.2 
As we explain in Section 2, contemporary Latin American tax systems reflect the accumulated 
influence of different principles, theoretical approaches, political forces, private interests, and policy 
decisions. At different periods, governments pressed macroeconomic concerns, businesses worried about 
efficiency, progressive groups pushed for equity, and interest groups pushed their particular concerns. 
Some want taxation issues to be on the policy agenda, while others – especially those that pay less tax than 
they should – try to avoid and quash debate.  
The consolidation of democracy in Latin America and the shift away from protected markets since 
the 1980s have placed a range of pressures on tax regimes. Democracy has unleashed new and vocal 
demands. The liberalisation of finance and trade has strengthened the pressures to harmonise tax systems 
internationally. Finally, rising public debt demands increases in revenue-raising capacity.  
Responses to these pressures lead to various dilemmas, especially for Latin American countries. 
Dependence on foreign capital and vulnerability to short-run capital movements limit the options 
available to governments. Large populations of poor people and high income and wealth inequality limit 
the potential tax base. Researchers and policy-makers have tried to address these issues without replicating 
earlier mistakes. A more active tax policy may be part of a transparent and sustainable solution.  
The approach to tax reform has been heavily influenced by several theoretical approaches. These are 
not specifically Latin American, but, in varying degrees, components of a shared set of international ideas, 
albeit one with a strong Anglophone flavouring. Each approach to tax reform derives from a different 
answer to the following question: What should be the main concern when designing tax systems? There is an 
enormous range of potential specific answers to that question. We find that, in the recent literature at 
least, there are four major approaches, each reducible to a single question: 
                                                 
1  The literature on the effects of taxation for economic development and government performance is abundant. 
Comprehensive reviews are presented in Newbery and Stern (1987); Gillis (1989); Bird and Oldman (1990); 
Bird (1992); Burgess and Stern (1993); and Tanzi and Zee (2000). 
2  There is a vast literature in political science and political sociology that looks at the impacts of taxation on state 
building and the legitimacy of political representation systems. The literature on the interactions between 
taxation and political development for developed societies is surveyed in Tilly (1992) and Campbell (1993). 
Moore (1998) and Moore and Rakner (2002) compile and review several pieces directly related to developing 
countries. 
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• Will the system be efficient and effective from the perspective of conventional micro-economics? 
(The public economics approach). 
• Will the system be responsive to the needs of those concerned with macroeconomic management? 
(The macroeconomic approach). 
• Is the system easy and cheap for government agencies to administer and taxpayers to use? (The 
administrative approach). 
• What are the implications of the system for governability and political legitimacy? (The political 
approach). 
 
Table 1.1 Summary characteristics of alternative approaches to analysing taxation 
Approach Key concerns Typical policy advice 
Public economics Microeconomic 
efficiency; equity; 
optimal taxation 
Tax structure should be neutral; zero tax on intermediate 
goods; benefit taxes and taxes on immobile tax bases 
should be assigned to local government; taxes on mobile 
tax bases should be assigned to central government 
Macroeconomic Short-term stability; 
Long-term accumulation 
Aggregate tax take should stabilise public debt; tax 
structure should emphasise stable revenue flows rather 
than counter-cyclical fluctuations; tax structure should 
promote accumulation for long-term growth 
Administrative Administrative 
efficiency; effectiveness 
Tax structure should be simple for both collectors and 
payers; tax administration should be professional and 
bureaucratic-rational 
Political Societal legitimacy; 
institutional capacity; 
political development 
Tax reform requires approval from a variety of social 
actors; taxation should be clearly linked to expenditures 
and should improve equity; tax policy and administration 
should be transparent and accountable 
 
The policy implications of these approaches often conflict with one another. As a result, it may be difficult 
to find proposals that lead to simultaneous progress on two or more of these criteria – or even, less 
ambitiously, that advance one set of objectives without compromising another. Poll taxes, for example, are 
flat taxes on all resident adults regardless of income, spending patterns or other socioeconomic 
characteristics. They were the fiscal basis of many early states; microeconomists judge them neutral with 
respect to economic activities; if variable, they offer significant advantages as instruments of 
macroeconomic adjustment; and they are administratively simple. However, the concept of a poll tax 
strongly violates norms of equity, not to mention current norms of political legitimacy. The British 
experience of introducing a poll tax in the 1980s serves as a warning to those who ignore one or more of 
the approaches to tax.3 The following section describes the main concerns and policy implications of 
literature within each approach. 
 
                                                 
3  See Smith (1991) for a more detailed description and analysis of this experience. 
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1.1 The public economics approach 
Public finance economists emphasise the principles of (microeconomic) efficiency and equity. The notion 
of microeconomic efficiency – otherwise labelled as economic, allocative or Pareto efficiency – is 
foundational to modern economics. This approach begins from the proposition that, in the presence of 
well-functioning markets, taxes are intrinsically distortionary: even if they fund public goods, they have to 
be viewed as a necessary evil. They divert resources to the public sector and distort market operations. 
These distortions impose economic costs, which either are not appropriated by any economic agent or are 
appropriated by one agent to the detriment of others. Such costs are often referred to as deadweight, or 
welfare, losses. The efficiency principle enjoins policymakers to minimise such costs through the choice of 
an optimal level and structure of taxes, given certain revenue needs. This principle has spawned a wide 
literature on optimal taxation.  
But surely this emphasis on efficiency is different from – and possibly opposed to, in both spirit and 
substance – a concern with equity? In fact, the optimal taxation literature has defined efficiency and equity 
together such that efficient tax systems are optimal in terms of production and consumption and are at the 
very least neutral in distributional terms across individuals. This concept of equity differs from explicitly 
normative and ethical efforts to shift wealth from the rich to the poor, but is consistent with the notion of 
an optimally efficient distribution of wealth. To frame equity in this sense, conventional tax analysis 
focuses on the question of how alternative taxing schemes distribute the burden of taxation and output 
reduction. This burden includes the deadweight loss imposed by the tax system as well as the value of real 
resources extracted by the state. Such a definition allows them to disaggregate the concept of equity into 
two dimensions: horizontal and vertical equity. A tax system is said to be horizontally equitable if it treats 
equals equally. Two persons with equal welfare before tax should have equal welfare after. The more 
general operational principal is neutrality: there should not be arbitrary distortions when one compares the 
tax incentives facing citizens participating in different economic activities. The same tax burdens should 
fall on butchers as well as bakers; enterprises that export and those that import; firms that produce shoes 
and firms that conduct market surveys; and families that eat tortillas and those that prefer rice.  
The principle of vertical equity focuses on how the tax system treats persons of differing initial 
welfare levels. If two individuals have different welfare before tax is levied, those with higher welfare 
might be expected to contribute more.4 Such a system is progressive, and taxing the poor more heavily 
than the rich is considered regressive. The concept of vertical equity approximates more closely to more 
normative approaches to equity and allows for calculations of an optimal tax regime given a desired 
distribution of wealth. Of course, the “desired distribution of wealth” calls for judgements about the 
relative  benefits  of  extra  income  to  the  poor  and  the  wealthy.  The  difficulty  of  making  definitive 
                                                 
4  Income is one, but not the only, component of individual welfare. 
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judgements often leaves the public economics approach handicapped when it comes to vertical equity 
concerns. Most often, its proponents offer vertical neutrality – income or wealth distribution should at 
least be no worse after taxes than before. 
Public economics theories essentially combine efficiency and equity principles by optimising tax 
structure with respect to a welfare function.5 A thorough review of the evolving literature on taxation is 
beyond the scope of this survey; instead we will concentrate on reporting its most important results for 
Latin America.6  
Much attention has been paid to the advisability of direct taxes (e.g. income taxes) versus indirect 
taxes (e.g. taxes on consumption). There seems to be a perception that income taxes should be preferred 
on equity grounds while consumption taxes should be preferred on efficiency grounds. However, it is 
unclear how far this assumption is valid in practice.7 Optimal tax theory suggests that constant marginal 
income tax rates are neutral and also the most efficient in terms of after-tax income equality because they 
result in no disincentive to effort (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971).8  
There is also consensus around the concept of neutrality in consumption taxes. Differential tax rates 
on final goods, promoted by some people on equity grounds, are a less efficient means to redistribute 
income than the use of direct payments to households (Atkison and Stiglitz 1980; Deaton and Stern 1986). 
Also, a zero rate on intermediate goods induces optimal consumption and production, implying that 
turnover taxes should be replaced by the Value Added Tax (VAT) or final sales taxes. Moreover, applying 
the principle of neutrality to international trade, viewed as a type of productive activity, implies that rates 
on imports and exports should also be set to zero. Taxes on such goods would create disincentives for 
domestically produced and consumed goods (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971). 
An active subfield of the optimal tax literature has been the study of the assignment of tax bases and 
tax revenues among different levels of government in federal or non-unitary systems. Most of the formal 
work has been summarised and compiled in McLure (1983).9 Three results emerged as particularly robust 
in the literature (Bird 1999): 
                                                 
5  Ramsey (1927) represents the first attempt to formalize this problem, often referred in the economic literature 
as the optimal tax problem. 
6  See Burgess and Stern (1993), Tanzi and Zee (1997, 2000), for recent surveys of the optimal tax theory. Heady 
(1993)’s survey is particularly useful due to its explicit presentation of both the strengths and weaknesses of 
optimal taxation as a guide to policy-making. 
7  The perception that income taxes entail higher welfare costs than taxing consumption stems from the 
observation by Atkison and Stiglitz that an income tax includes two broad components: a tax on labour income 
and a tax on savings or capital income (Atkison and Stiglitz 1980: chapter 14). Since labour income is shown to 
be equivalent to a tax on consumption in a dynamic environment, the income tax gives rises to an additional 
distortion on savings that is absent in the consumption tax. On the other hand, taxing consumption is 
inherently more regressive than taxing income, since it is administratively infeasible to effectively implement, 
on a large scale, graduated tax rates on consumption. Kaldor (1955) shows that, at least in theory, such a system 
is possible. 
8  Heady (1993) emphasised that the breadth and simplicity of constant marginal rates would have the additional 
advantage of improving administrative effectiveness. 
9  See McLure (1998) and Bird (1999) for a series of critiques and reviews to the original formulation of the 
optimal tax assignment. The optimal tax assignment problem has been part of the more general problem of 
allocating tax and spending functions in federal systems introduced in Oates (1972). 
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(i) Lower levels of government should, as much as possible, rely on benefit taxation10 of mobile units.  
(ii) To the extent that non-benefit taxes need to be employed on mobile economic units, perhaps for 
redistributive purposes, this should be done at higher levels of government. 
(iii) To the extent that local governments make use of non-benefit taxes, they should employ them on tax 
bases that are relatively immobile across local jurisdictions (e.g. property or land). 
 
More recent work on optimal taxation has been focused on generalising previous results to environments 
where: (a) markets are not efficient due to the existence of imperfect forms of competition or to the 
existence of externalities; (b) financial assets (capital gains, inheritance, dividends, etc.) are considered 
more explicitly; and (c) the benefits of tax revenues in the form of an increased provision of public goods 
and transfers is integrated into the model.11  
The key to the public economics approach is the notion of maximising a social welfare function that 
depends primarily, if not solely, on efficiency and equity. Other concerns are downplayed. But in most 
Latin American contexts, other (macroeconomic, administrative and political) considerations clearly 
deserve attention, and policy-makers have been wary of accepting the prescriptions of public economics 
without question. Nevertheless, the public economics approach offers useful tools for comparing tax 
reform options in a relatively rigorous way.  
 
1.2 The macroeconomic approach 
The macroeconomic approach is broadly defined here as dealing with the impact of taxation on economic 
aggregates – the level and distribution of income, household savings, corporate investment, level of 
inflation and public debt. One can divide macroeconomic approaches into those that focus on the long 
term and those that deal with short run concerns. 
The long term macroeconomic capacity of alternative tax systems has been mostly evaluated with 
respect to their impact on per capita income. This debate goes back to Adam Smith and is a central theme 
in the literature on development and growth. In the economic models popular in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Lewis 1954; Solow 1956) high levels of national savings were seen as the key to economic growth and 
development. Correspondingly, tax systems were expected to minimise or avoid taxing sectors and 
individuals with a high propensity to save and to tax heavily sectors that did not. Governments generally 
                                                 
10  Benefit taxes are taxes levied on the basis of the benefit principle, which states that each individual ought to pay 
taxes commensurate to the benefits he or she receives from the government. In contrast, non-benefit taxes are 
those based on the ability to pay principle, which states that the amount each taxpayer pays ought to be related 
to his or her level of economic well being (Slemrod and Bakija 1996: 52). Assuming that individual benefits can 
be correctly measured, benefit taxes do not affect the distribution of interpersonal welfare, and are considered 
neutral with respect to the equity principle. 
11  ‘Standard optimal tax theory does not provide a rationale for the high rates of taxation on alcohol, tobacco and 
petrol. If there is justification, it should be found either in terms of externalities that the consumption of such 
goods impose on other people or on the basis of particularistic behavior.’ (Heady 1993). ‘The primary reason 
why optimal tax theory has little to say about the overall level of burden is that much of this theory has been 
developed to suggest the optimal structure of taxes in a static context to raise a given level of revenues [. . .] To 
relax this assumption in a meaningful way, for purposes of normative policy prescription, would necessitate the 
explicit modelling of the benefits from public spending to be financed by tax revenues’ (Tanzi and Zee 2000). 
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interpreted this to mean squeezing tax out of rural populations, and for conservative regimes it justified 
regressive tax regimes. Recent work on endogenous growth theory has emphasised the contribution of 
equity to national economic performance and researchers are making a macroeconomic case for more 
progressive tax structures (Galor and Zeira 1993; Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Persson and Tabellini 1994; 
Benabou 1996).12  
Short-run macroeconomic analysis has been concerned mostly with the ability of the tax system to 
respond to changes in the business cycle. Standard Keynesian theory suggests that passive tax policies 
might exacerbate business cycles, and that fiscal policy should be actively counter-cyclical. Governments 
should increase spending and lower taxes to help the economy out of recession. However, tax changes do 
not have an immediate effect on economic activity, and time lags may mean that activist tax policies 
exacerbate cycles rather than stabilise them. The consensus now is that tax policy should be designed to 
generate a stable flow of government revenue over economic cycles, even in the face of shocks to the tax 
base (Barro 1979). In the context of Latin America, inflationary booms and busts were among the most 
common shocks, and there has been a search for tax structures that are buoyant and stable in the face of 
inflation.  
The analytical differences between the public economics approach and the macroeconomic approach 
have become less marked in recent years. Macroeconomic models have started to rely more consistently 
on microeconomic fundamentals and optimal taxation models have started to incorporate macroeconomic 
considerations, especially revenue capacity. Most of the current research on dynamic optimal tax theory, 
especially work related to the choice between systems based on consumption and on income taxes, has 
been motivated by macroeconomic concerns about income growth and inequality.13 Despite this gradual 
convergence between the two approaches, they continue to produce divergent policy prescriptions on 
many occasions. And neither pays much attention to the administrative (or political) concerns to which we 
now turn. 
 
1.3 The administrative approach 
The defining features of what we have termed the administrative approach are an emphasis on efficiency and 
effectiveness. In particular, the notion of efficiency focuses on the administrative costs incurred by the 
government in collecting and enforcing tax laws and the costs to taxpayers of complying with those laws.14 
The concept of effectiveness encompasses concerns that taxes should be predictable, transparent, and 
enforced by a fair judicial system. In practice, the administrative approach seeks technical solutions to 
administrative problems of raising a given amount of resources with a minimum of waste and effort.15 The 
                                                 
12  However, the debate about the effects of equity remains open as an even more recent wave of empirical 
analysis suggests a positive effect of income inequality on economic growth (Forbes 2000; Li and Zou 1998). 
13  See Tanzi and Zee (1997) for a general review of the macroeconomic literature on the effects of taxes. 
14  See Bird (1992) for a general survey and Bagchi, Bird and Das Gupta (1995) for an overview with a particular 
economics focus.  
15  This approach has close affinities to the good governance agenda that emerged in the 1990s, with an emphasis on 
efficient, independent, accountable and open government (World Bank 1997).  
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most common analytic tool associated with the administrative approach is the notion of the tax gap – the 
difference between tax actually paid and the tax that should have been paid according to existing law and 
statutes. The tax gap comprises the sum of: tax evasion; tax arrears (taxes declared but not paid); the 
shortfall of taxes due to taxpayers misunderstanding of the tax laws; and any other forms of non-
compliance.  
Economists have extended the formal microeconomic analysis associated with the public economics 
approach to taxation to encompass the kinds of administrative costs estimated in tax gap analysis 
(Slemrod 1990; Slemrod and Yitzhaki 1996). They develop the concept of marginal efficiency cost of 
funds (MECF), which incorporates the cost of raising taxes into the estimate of the value of taxes to the 
government.16 Thus, optimal taxes are those that raise a desired amount of revenues with the lowest 
MECF and the fewest distortions (neutrality), and promote the desired distribution of wealth (equity).  
Some fairly straightforward advice emerges from this attention to administrative efficiency: 
administrative efficiency can be improved in the short-run by simplifying the tax structure. Simple tax 
structures are easier and cheaper for tax agencies to administer and for taxpayers to obey. Governments 
are advised to minimise the number and variety of tax exemptions, tax brackets, and specific incentives 
(subsidies, or tax expenditures).  
Over the medium and long run, the administrative approach focuses more explicitly on effectiveness. 
This refers to the predictability and legality of taxes and the transparency and accountability of 
government (Bird 1992). Effective taxation, according to this view, is similar to any other public policy 
domain, in that it requires a professional, well-paid, autonomous, Weberian bureaucracy. This approach, as 
might be expected, has been of particular interest to people directly involved in and responsible for tax 
collection and the implementation of tax policy.  
Some have argued for an independent and autonomous tax collecting authority. The declared 
objectives are to improve collection performance through (a) reducing “political interference” and 
(b) insulating the tax collection apparatus from the constraints of regular public service employment. In 
particular, elite entrance exams, better pay, and autonomous control of budgets and promotions have 
been proposed. Observers believe that these reforms can improve performance even in conditions of 
poor governance in other parts of the public administration, creating islands of efficiency that are 
insulated from external pressures (Geddes 1994). In recent years, independent revenue authorities have 
been created in several African and Latin America countries. The record of these newly created 
bureaucracies has been spotty, however. In Africa, the record has been particularly poor  (Fjeldstad 2002), 
                                                 
16  They define MECF as the sum of the expected tax revenue and the expected leaked tax revenue divided by the 
sum of the expected tax revenue. 
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and in Latin America, even short term successes have eventually faded. New agencies, though initially 
autonomous and effective, slowly get infiltrated by the same powerful societal interests that capture other 
parts of government (Taliercio 2003). 
It is clear from this record that reform of tax administration alone is not enough. Nobody would 
argue against encouraging professionalisation and other solutions that attempt to create a Weberian 
bureaucracy. Still, these reforms are unlikely to survive if there is no broader transformation of the way in 
which state and society interact. Even a bureaucratic and rational state will be unable to resist if powerful 
societal groups possess both political and economic power. In such situations, a more fundamental 
political change must occur for the state to enjoy sufficient capacity to both resist these groups and extract 
wealth. 
 
1.4 The political approach 
The political approach focuses on the inter-relationships between tax systems and political regimes. It is 
evident that taxation is not simply a technical question, and is inherently political. Proponents of what we 
term the political approach have a diversity of concerns. What they have in common is an emphasis on 
making political analysis central to the tax policy debate.17  
Within this general category of political approaches to taxation, there are perhaps three main 
sub-approaches: societal, institutional, and developmental. The societal approach is political in the most 
straightforward and commonplace sense of the term: the study of particular processes and sequences with 
an emphasis on the clash of interests – “winners”, “losers” and the political tactics they employ. This 
approach usually focuses on the relative power of different social actors, and the ways in which taxation 
structures are the outcomes of social conflict. Both pluralist and Marxist political theory fall into this 
societal framework. According to (simplistic) Marxists, for example, the state is the executive committee of 
the dominant class and will use tax to promote their accumulation. Where the state acts against the short-
term interests of elites, it is only a temporary effort to sustain long-term accumulation. 
One implication of the societal sub-approach is that an efficient, equitable and effective tax reform 
has to be in the interests of important social actors. Reforms that produce such a tax system will not be 
politically feasible if distributional effects cannot be anticipated, let alone negotiated. Political feasibility 
thus depends on the elaboration of detailed analysis and discussion that predicts distributive outcomes. 
This allows ‘the limitation of risk so that affected groups will be willing to bear some additional – but 
predictably contained – costs’ (Ascher 1989: 414). Unfortunately, uncertainty about the outcome of 
reform can be sufficient to prevent reform (Rodrik and Fernandez 1991). Uncertainty may be so great that  
                                                 
17  Campbell (1993) reviews the political sociology literature. The political economy literature has addressed the 
determinants of tax reform in the more general context of the determinants of structural economic reforms. 
On top of trying to understand the timing of reforms, the literature has also explored the sequencing (why 
reforms are implemented simultaneously and some times one at a time) and the speed (why some countries go 
“cold turkey” while others apply each reform gradually) of reforms. Tommasi and Velasco (1996) review the 
literature. 
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only a serious crisis will make actors even consider reform (Drazen and Grilli 1993). Of course, different 
political institutions, such as centralisation or delegative democracy, can make it easier to impose reforms, 
but partisan coalitions and cooperation across branches and levels of government are necessary if reforms 
are to remain effective (O’Donnell 1994). 
The interests of stakeholders influence the likelihood that reform will occur and the shape that it 
takes. Influential segments of society must be convinced that they should pay taxes – not an easy task in 
environments characterised by poor services and widespread corruption. Weaker segments of society may 
have less wealth to contribute, but it is equally important that they are included. They provide the mass 
support for reform, and can push it in a progressive direction. Bureaucratic cadres are also important. In 
situations where bureaucrats resist reform or fall back into corrupt behaviour, reforms are doomed. For 
example, independent revenue authorities, despite the best intentions, are often beset by these problems, 
as bureaucrats fail to reform their behaviour or simply use new institutions to recreate clientelist and 
corrupt practices. 
Does this mean that nothing can be done if social forces do not favour tax reform? The institutional 
approach proposes a second best solution in the design of institutions. Institutions bound the interaction 
of social forces, define which interests will be represented, and can bias the outcome of social interaction. 
This powerful insight increased attention to the incentives built into institutions – such as presidential and 
parliamentary systems, electoral cycles, powerful central banks, finance ministries, autonomous revenue 
authorities, and decentralisation (Buchanan 1987; Besley and Case 2002).  
Together, the societal and institutional approaches highlight the way actors come together in systems 
of political representation and are limited by state institutions, themselves the product of historical 
contexts. Thus, tax systems are understood to emerge from the pressures of social forces, but only after 
they have been filtered by formal and informal institutions of the state.  
The third political sub-approach is the political development approach, which reverses the direction of 
causal enquiry. Instead of asking how existing political forces and institutions shape tax structures and tax 
reforms, the political development approach suggests that institutions of taxation affect the type and 
quality of governance, or the “political development” of particular countries (Brennan and Buchanan 
1980; Bates 1989; Campbell 1993). From the perspective of the political development approach, taxation 
is as much a part of a social contract between state and society as it is a mechanism of financing 
government. A state with high levels of political legitimacy can depend on citizens’ quasi-voluntary 
compliance to contribute to public goods (quasi-voluntary because there is always some element of 
coercion). As a result, states that are accepted as legitimate are capable of securing resources to govern, to 
develop, and to compete in the international economic and political arena. The central question in 
taxation, therefore, is what the state must offer to earn citizen compliance. Citizens’ demands vary with 
regimes and over time, but they include some combination of accountable institutions, material benefits, 
and cultural meaning.  
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Much of the history of Western European state-building in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries has 
been presented in terms of absolute monarchs securing resources to compete militarily in the international 
arena by gradually transferring power and material benefits to institutions that represented taxpayers (Tilly 
1975, 1992). The terms of the social contract that emerged were the rights and services offered by the 
state in exchange for the revenues given by citizens. 
In most cases in Latin America, the social contract is notably weak, and at best applies to only a 
narrow segment of society. Many citizens are trapped within clientelist relations, informality, social 
exclusion, and other forms of marginality. Even if they make tax contributions and benefit from public 
expenditure, there is no notion of a contract between citizen and state. They pay only what they have to 
pay to avoid being audited and caught. In part, this is a result of the socio-economic characteristics of the 
region: large inequalities, a narrow middle class, limited education, low participation, oligarchic agricultural 
elites, and a large informal sector. Political institutions bear some of the blame also, as they are incapable 
of penetrating society to extract resources, extend benefits to secure compliance, and generate the 
coalitions and embeddedness that create legitimacy and capacity. 
The focus on state legitimacy and capacity highlights the connection between taxation and 
governance concerns. Statist political arguments emphasise the notion of taxation as an instrument and 
indicator of state institutional capacity. According to statist perspectives, states are institutions that seek to 
preserve themselves, maximise their power and expand their capacity. Taxation and tax administration are 
both measures of, and inputs into, these ends (Levi 1988: esp. 48–71). Political development involves the 
mobilisation of legitimacy and coercive capacity to generate tax compliance. In some analyses, nation-
states are only considered institutionalised when their tax administration can extend territorial control and 
penetrate society. An extension of this logic is that those states that fail to enhance tax capacity are 
doomed to be swallowed, defeated, or simply retreat in the face of more institutionalised nation-states 
(Tilly 1992: esp. 63–5).  
Liberal political arguments regard taxation slightly differently. For liberals, the growth of taxation is 
linked intrinsically to the rise of the liberal, democratic polity.18 The expansion of state capacity, so 
important to the statists, is seen from the opposite side. Citizen contributions are only forthcoming if the 
state allows citizens representative institutions, competing jurisdictions, and ample room for free 
enterprise – all of which serve to check the expansion of state demands for tax.  
Statists and liberals offer advice to governments that face powerful societal opposition to tax reform. 
For the state to overcome such opposition, statist institutions of capacity and liberal institutions of 
legitimacy must both be cultivated. One option is to target specific groups, especially marginalised groups, 
with benefits and privileged political access to act as a counterweight to entrenched opponents. 
Corporatist institutions, participatory institutions, and other representative arenas are examples. Also, the 
state  can use its  tax capacity to regulate and control opponents,  for example  by incorporating them into 
                                                 
18  For a summary, see Moore (2001). 
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the tax net where they have previously escaped – notably the informal sector, beneficiaries of off-shore 
income, and agricultural elites. These efforts to deliberately transform society through the use of state 
capacity and legitimacy are important parts of the kind of new relationships between state and society.  
Less grandiose implications of this approach are simply to make more explicit links between the taxes 
citizens contribute and the benefits they receive. A few examples of such explicit linkage are user fees, 
earmarking, and oversight mechanisms. User fees are the most direct, though perhaps limited version, in 
which there is a direct relationship between fees paid by a citizen and the services that citizen receives. 
Earmarked taxes allow for the beneficiary of service to be a different citizen than the contributor, but it 
retains the explicit link between tax contributions and a particular type of expenditure. Earmarked taxes 
have been criticised because of the budgetary and macroeconomic policy constraints they place on 
governments (Bates 1989), but there may be a compromise. Setting low thresholds – for example, 
requiring that 10 per cent of a particular tax must be spent on education – can provide the legitimacy of an 
explicit link without constraining the government too tightly. Finally, citizens sense that they control or 
oversee the use of their taxes through mechanisms of transparency and accountability, especially through 
representative and even, participatory, institutions. Taxation, in sum, should be complemented by changes 
in institutions to link the distribution of tax revenues to benefits.  
 
2  Latin American tax systems 
Early comprehensive assessments of the stylised facts and idiosyncrasies about Latin American and 
Caribbean (LAC) tax systems were compiled under the Joint Tax Programme of OAS, IDB and CEPAL 
(Joint Tax Programme 1965a, 1965b), and in Bird and Oldman (1968, 1990). Descriptions of Latin 
American tax policy and administration over the last two decades are presented in Shome (1992, 1995, 
1999), IDB (1996, 1998a) and CEPAL (1998). Early studies on tax incidence in Latin America were 
compiled by Bird and De Wulf (1973), while IDB (1998a) reviews the current literature. Winkler (1994) 
explains how taxes are assigned between different levels of government, and how systems of fiscal 
transfers between them are designed and administered.  
 
2.1 Stylised facts 
Latin American tax systems historically have been characterised by (a) a low average tax take; (b) a tax 
structure weighted towards indirect taxes with narrow tax bases, multiple rates and many exemptions; (c) a 
limited tax administration capacity; (d) a mild redistributive impact; and (e) a highly centralised tax 
assignment with tax revenues transferred to subnational governments in the form of ad-hoc negotiated 
block grants.  
Table 2.1 summarises some of the common characteristics of Latin American tax systems, and 
displays it in comparative perspective. Average tax take, defined as the ratio of tax revenues in the gross 
domestic product (GDP), has been persistently smaller in Latin America than in OECD countries. 
Overall, the Latin American tax take has been fairly similar to the Asian average. However, if we exclude 
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South Asia from the Asian average, the remaining countries of Southeast and East Asia have a higher tax 
take than Latin America.19 Other studies have shown that the tax take in several Latin American countries 
is below the expected figure once one takes into account their per capita income levels (IDB 1998b). In 
1997, for instance, the average tax take in the region was 18 per cent while the average tax burden among 
countries with similar per capita incomes to the average was 24 per cent (IDB 1998b).  
 
Table 2.1 Tax burden and structure in LAC in comparative perspective 
(as % of GDP) 
 Tax revenue Direct Domestic indirect International 
trade 
 1975–
85 
1986–
97 
1975–
85 
1986–
97 
1975–
85 
1986–
97 
1975–
85 
1986–
97 
OECD 28.3 34.2 9.9 12.4 8.6 10.5 1.0 0.5 
Asia (South 
and 
Southeast) 
14.0 15.8 5.3 5.6 4.2 5.8 4.0 3.4 
Africa 17.6 18.8 5.7 6.3 4.3 5.7 6.4 5.6 
Latin 
America 
14.9 15.2 3.8 3.4 5.0 5.5 3.1 2.2 
Caribbean 23.3 22.4 6.4 .0 6.7 6.2 6.3 5.4 
 
Source: IMF, Government Finance Statistics. 
Notes: 
1) Total tax revenue includes social security contributions. 
2) After 1994, the “OECD” excludes Mexico. 
3) “Income taxes” include taxes on capital gains and profits, but exclude property taxes. 
 
Undertaxation of income, wealth and property has been a persistent and long recognised feature in Latin 
American tax systems. ‘There are some countries which have been conspicuously unsuccessful in 
imposing taxes on the wealthy classes – chiefly, I think, the countries of Latin America’ (Kaldor 1963: 
414).20 Not only are average income tax takes smaller than in the rest of the developing world, but the 
difference seems to be increasing. Between 1986 and 1997, for instance, the average income tax take in 
LAC amounted to less than 4 per cent of GDP, against 5.6 per cent in Asia and more than 6 per cent in 
African countries. Income taxes in Latin America have been characterised by multiple exemptions and 
incentives, high marginal tax rates, and lack of integration between personal and corporate sources 
(Rodriguez 1993; Shome 1995). They have been designed to give special treatment to the agricultural 
                                                 
19  Between 1991 and 1995, the average tax burden in LA was 14.1 per cent of GDP in contrast to 16.8 per cent in 
Southeast Asian countries (IDB 1996). 
20  Also, see Jenkins, ‘The property tax in Latin America has been frequently discussed but seldom implemented’ 
(1995: 7).  
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sector and some specific industries (Shome 1999). Personal income tax rates have been highly progressive. 
Until the early 1990s, top marginal rates were higher than 50 per cent for many countries. Also, minimum 
levels of taxable income tended to be set at very high levels – e.g. from three times average per capita 
income in Brazil to up to 10 times in Ecuador, Nicaragua and Guatemala (IDB 1998b). 
Indirect taxes, in the form of taxes on domestic and internationally traded goods and services, 
represent the bulk of Latin American tax revenues. The contribution of domestic taxes on consumption 
has increased in the last two decades. Value added taxes have become an important component of 
consumption taxes, compensating for poor income tax collections and decreasing taxes on foreign trade.21  
Table 2.1 shows that the burden and structure of tax systems differs substantially between Latin 
American and Caribbean countries (CEPAL 1998). Average tax takes in the Caribbean are higher, rely 
more on taxation of foreign goods and services, and generally include more direct tax. Direct tax levies 
have been around seven per cent of GDP in Caribbean countries, versus less than four per cent in Latin 
America. The contrast between Central America and Caribbean countries is particularly interesting due to 
their geographical proximity and especially due to their similar small and open-economy nature.  
The limited capacity of Latin American tax agencies is reflected in a large tax gap – the difference 
between what revenue authorities would collect if everyone paid the tax legally due and what is actually 
collected. The gap can be attributed to avoidance, evasion, and tax expenditures (CEPAL 1998).22 Tax 
expenditures take the form of multiple tax exemptions, deductions and amnesties to particular sectors, 
regions, or taxpayers. In addition to sacrificing revenues, these tax expenditure provisions create 
opportunities for tax avoidance. Of particular worry is the ease with which citizens avoid income taxes, 
for example by shifting income off-shore. In such cases, avoidance – the switching of economic activity to 
non-taxed sectors – often borders on evasion, in which tax law is simply violated. Evasion is also possible 
because of defunct withholding schemes and non-existent auditing mechanisms, especially with respect to 
income tax (Jenkins 1995).  
These policy shortcomings create challenges that revenue authorities are often unable to overcome. 
They lack trained and equipped professional staff with well-designed career plans. As a result, they are 
susceptible to corruption, and evasion is more likely (CIAT 1996). The high discretionary power of the 
executive branch to alter tax policy further compromises the administrative capacity of revenue authorities 
(Shome 1999).23  
                                                 
21  However, domestic taxes levied on intermediate stages of production are still an important component of 
indirect taxes in some countries of the region (Shome 1995). 
22  Income tax evasion and avoidance are quite large in Chile, where around 23 per cent of the potential tax base is 
not reported due to loopholes and evasion (Engel et al. 1997). VAT evasion is also substantial, averaging above 
20 per cent of actual receipts (CEPAL 1998). 
23  For example, see Shome’s comment, ‘In many Latin American countries the tax code tends to become dotted 
with executive orders for administrative convenience [. . .] Upon inspection, it is remarkable how far the day-to 
day interpretation and application sometimes are far from the original design and intent behind the law’ 
(1999: 17). 
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Studies of the overall tax incidence in Latin America date back to Bird and De Wulf (1973).24 
Assessing the results of 29 studies relating to 17 Latin American countries, they concluded that in only 
four countries was the tax system (mildly) redistributive. Recent studies of tax incidence for specific Latin 
American countries have confirmed this position – Centro de Estudios Bonaerense (1997) for Argentina; 
Engel et al. (1997) for Chile; Santana and Rathe (1992) for the Dominican Republic; and Bahl et al. (1996) 
for Guatemala. These findings suggest scope for greater progressivity. However, progressive statutory 
income tax schedules do appear to result in progressive tax incidence. The two highest income deciles pay 
taxes that, as a proportion of their incomes, are several times higher than those of all other deciles, which 
are usually exempt. However, in no case is the share of income paid by the highest decile above 8 per cent 
of their total income, an actual tax burden substantially smaller than the average tax rate one would 
anticipate from the steep marginal tax rates found in the tax code. This result is a clear indication of the 
high levels of tax evasion among upper-income groups.  
Historically, Latin American governments have been highly centralised. In the last two decades, 
several countries have devolved and begun to share important responsibilities subnational governments. 
For most of the region, however, the assignment of tax bases still reflects the former centralised 
governance pattern. Tax policy, administration and revenue collection are, for the most part, concentrated 
in the central government. As a result, Latin American subnational governments depend on 
intergovernmental transfers for their finances, and have little capacity to mobilise their own resources 
(Aghon and Casas 1999).  
Intermediate levels of government, at state, provincial or department level and, especially, local 
governments, do a poor job in managing the few resources they control. Benefit taxes in the form of user-
fees are usually under-exploited or set at levels insufficient to cover the long-term costs of the services 
provided (Lopez-Murphy 1995). Local government officials also lack the methods, autonomy, resources 
and political support to exploit effectively their main potential source of own revenues: the property tax 
(Lopez-Murphy 1995; Aghon and Casas 1999). Last but not least, the design of intergovernmental 
transfers undermines local tax effort. Most intergovernmental transfers take either the form of revenue-
sharing or block grants, in which resources coming from the centre are not conditional on the compliance 
of subnational governments with any specific tax effort or tax capacity criteria (Winkler 1994).  
 
2.2 The special features of Latin America 
Although the stylised facts presented above serve as a fair first approximation of Latin American tax 
systems, they hide important differences in tax take, tax structure and tax assignment within the region. 
These should be taken into account in the design and implementation of tax reform for particular 
countries or any subset of countries in the region. 
                                                 
24  For a better understanding of the state of the art on the incidence of taxes in developing countries, refer to 
Chu et al. (2000). 
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Latin American countries can be divided among low, medium and high collectors according to the 
size of their tax takes (Shome 1999). Summary figures are displayed in Table 2.2. Countries with persistent 
low tax takes include Paraguay, El Salvador and Guatemala. Argentina, Colombia and Mexico also present 
surprisingly low tax takes given their medium income sizes. Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Panama 
are in the high tax category.25 These aggregate figures include social security contributions, which are 
particularly large in countries such as Brazil, Costa Rica and Uruguay but account for a more modest share 
in Chile, Bolivia and Paraguay (CEPAL 1998). The figures exclude revenues generated by state-owned oil 
companies, which represent an important source of government financing in Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Venezuela, as does the copper industry to a lesser extent in Chile (Shome 1995; CEPAL 1998). The 
breadth and assignment of VAT is one source of heterogeneity across countries. In Argentina, and to 
large extent Chile, VAT is more broadly based than in Mexico and Colombia, where main articles in the 
basic consumption are zero-rated or exempted (IDB 1998b; Shome 1995). Brazil’s dual VAT is unique: 
federal and state governments are granted the right to administer distinctive VAT bases.26 
Looking at sub regions, average tax takes and tax structure does not seem to differ very much 
between Central and South America.27 The only exception is the share of tax revenues derived from 
international trade. In Central America (excluding Mexico), international trade taxes have been above 
2 and even 3 per cent of GDP in several countries. The average for the region during the 1990s was 3 per 
cent, double the figure for the average South American country in the same period and triple the Mexican 
figure.  
Latin American countries also vary with respect to their degrees of fiscal decentralisation as well as 
with the nature of fiscal arrangements between central and subnational governments (Lopez-Murphy 
1995). In Brazil, the most important source of tax revenue is a VAT assigned to the state level (ICMS) 
while in Chile all taxes are legislated, collected, and overseen by the central government. In countries like 
Brazil and Colombia, tax revenues have been decentralised more than expenditure functions. In 
Argentina, the opposite occurred, as more importance has been attached to the transfer of powers, 
especially in the areas of education and health care, while the financing of these services has been left to 
be defined later (Winkler 1994). 
 
                                                 
25  In Central America, Honduran and especially Nicaraguan data there is a striking high tax effort given level of 
income per capita. There is evidence that this is an artefact of consistently underestimated GDP, at least in the 
recent past, to bring advantages in debt forgiveness and exemptions from tariff limits. Such underestimations, 
obviously, inflate tax figures (We are indebted to Manuel Agosin of the IDB for this observation). 
26  See Varsano (2000) for a comprehensive overview of the Brazilian VAT system, a description of its problems 
and a proposed reform. 
27  See Stotsky and WoldeMariam (2002) for a recent overview of Central America tax systems  
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Table 2.2 Tax take and structure for Latin American countries 
(As % of GDP) (Consolidated Central Government) 
 Years Total 
tax 
revenue 
Other 
revenue 
Income 
tax 
Social 
security 
Payroll 
tax 
Domes-
tic cons-
umption 
tax 
Trade 
tax 
Domin-
ican 
Republic 
1990–98 14.1 1.4 2.5 0.6 0.0 4.8 6.0 
Mexico 1990–98 13.1 1.8 4.7 1.8 0.0 8.4 0.9 
Central 
America 
 15.5 3.9 2.9 4.2 0.0 6.1 3.0 
Panama 1990–98 22.0 10.4 5.9 6.0 0.0 5.3 1.7 
Nicara-
gua 
1990–95 20.8 1.8 2.5 12.7 0.0 9.7 4.5 
Costa 
Rica 
1990–99 17.7 2.6 2.2 5.7 0.0 7.0 2.8 
El 
Salvador 
1990–99 10.5 0.7 2.7 0.0 0.0 5.7 1.7 
Guate-
mala 
1990–99 8.2 6.7 1.9 0.0 0.0 4.4 1.6 
South 
America 
 15.2 3.2 3.9 2.6 0.2 6.1 1.5 
Uruguay 1990–99 26.0 2.0 2.7 8.2 0.2 9.8 1.4 
Brazil 1990–97 18.9 7.9 3.9 8.0 1.2 5.3 0.6 
Chile 1990–99 18.7 3.9 4.0 1.5 0.0 10.3 2.1 
Ecuador 1990–94 15.5 0.8 9.3 0.0 0.0 3.9 2.0 
Vene-
zuela 
1990–99 14.8 4.7 8.6 0.8 0.0 3.8 1.7 
Peru 1990–99 14.2 1.8 2.5 1.5 0.4 8.0 1.7 
Argentina 1990–98 12.1 1.2 1.3 4.7 0.0 4.6 1.0 
Bolivia 1990–99 11.9 4.4 0.9 1.6 0.0 6.9 1.1 
Colombia 1990–99 10.9 1.7 4.6 0.0 0.0 4.9 1.3 
Paraguay 1990–94 9.3 3.8 1.3 0.0 0.1 3.5 2.1 
 
Source: Government Finance Statistics (IMF). 
 
2.3 Origins 
A number of factors help explain the level and structure of Latin American tax systems: (a) colonial 
heritage, (b) political institutions and regimes (c) economic structure, (d) income inequality, (e) easy access 
to non-tax revenue sources, and (f) previous development strategies. 
There has been some speculation that the low tax takes of Latin American countries and their 
reliance on indirect taxation derive from the minor role played by war in the formation of their colonial 
states (Mahon 1997). Unlike European countries, colonial Latin American states were not built against 
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foreign invasion but to extract resources for the purposes of the metropolis. The legacy was difficulty in 
imposing direct forms of taxation, which required greater coercive capacity and legitimacy.28  
Differences between the Caribbean and most of Latin America have also been attributed to historical 
factors traceable to differences between English and Spanish colonialism (Thirsk 1997; CEPAL 1998). In 
particular, legal institutions that facilitate more formal labour markets may explain, in part, the greater 
presence of income taxes in the Caribbean (Stotsky and Wolde-Mariam 2002). In addition, Caribbean 
countries generally inherited the parliamentary governing institutions of their colonizers, while most Latin 
American countries copied the presidential constitution of the United States.29 In conditions of political 
division and polarisation, parliamentary systems offer the possibility of negotiating a compromise among 
elites in forming a government, while presidents must govern even if they face a legislature dominated by 
the opposition. There have been numerous studies on the impact of divided government in presidential 
systems, mostly focused on the states of the U.S.A. They generally suggest that, in such circumstances, it is 
more difficult to manage fiscal policy, especially to balance budgets (Alt and Lowry 1994). Similar 
dynamics are likely to be operating in Latin American presidential systems. 
Regime types also left their mark. Latin American countries have mostly alternated between military 
and more democratic regimes. With the exception of Peru, most military regimes adopted regressive tax 
policies. Democratic regimes varied more, but have frequently been enmeshed in fiscal problems, 
including those created by inability to undertake fiscal reforms and the pressure of important 
constituencies for tax expenditure (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991; Cheibub 1998).  
The origins of Latin American tax systems can also be traced to some of the general attributes of 
developing countries. A larger share of agriculture in total output and employment, a large informal sector, 
and limited technical capacity of the tax administration reduce the feasibility of direct taxes as reliable 
sources of revenue, and limit the total tax take (Tanzi and Zee 2000). In Latin America in particular, high 
income inequality concentrates both political and economic power, and undermines tax capacity and the 
political feasibility of direct taxation (Bird and Oldman 1968; Kaldor 1963; IDB 1998a). In addition, easy 
access to alternative government financing schemes such as foreign aid, subsidised loans, seignorage 
(printing money), and revenues from natural resources also play a role (Burgess and Stern 1993; Moore 
1998).  
Tax systems in Latin America also reflect development policy strategies. The policy of import 
substituting industrialisation, that was common until the early 1980s, implied high tariffs and tax 
incentives for selected growth-promoting sectors. The latter narrowed the corporate tax base and led to 
the creation of multiple corporate income tax rates (Perry and Herrera 1994; IDB 1996).  
 
                                                 
28  Gil Diaz (1990) observes that Mexico’s earliest taxes were imposed by the last Spanish viceroys of the colonial 
period, who imposed a heavy burden on the colonies to try to fund Spanish military needs.  
29  Geographical factors such as the greater ease of tax enforcement at custom borders in small islands, along with 
cultural traditions and attitudes towards the public sector, are also mentioned (Stotsky and WoldeMariam 
2002). 
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3  The approach to reform in Latin America 
 
3.1 Common features and rationale 
Perhaps the one item remaining relatively unchallenged in the Washington consensus is a set of tax 
reforms. There is broad agreement on the desirability of these reforms, general overviews of which are 
provided in Bird (1992), IDB (1996), Jenkins (1995), Perry and Herrera (1994), Rodriguez (1993), Shome 
(1992, 1995, 1999), Tanzi (1992). 
Before detailing this package of reforms, let us note that attempts to reform and harmonize Latin 
American tax regimes have occurred before, including in the early 1960s through programmes conducted 
jointly by the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and 
the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC). The Joint Tax Programme, as this effort was 
named, involved conferences on tax administration and fiscal policy, and a draft model tax code for Latin 
America (Joint Tax Programme 1965a; 1965b). Like current efforts, the aim was to stimulate similar 
reforms across the region. The key difference that defined the 1960s wave was a belief in ‘the superiority 
of direct taxes to indirect taxes, support for progressivity, and opposition to assignment or earmarking of 
tax revenue’ (Goode 1993: 38). These earlier reforms also centred more on tax policy design and less on 
tax administration.  
In contrast, tax reforms that were initiated in the 1980s and continued through the 1990s gave 
unprecedented attention to tax administration, while shifting the substantive emphasis toward indirect tax 
systems levied on domestic sources. These more recent reforms have aimed to (a) make the tax structure 
more neutral; (b) simplify and streamline legal and administrative tax operations; (c) enhance revenue 
collections; and (d) promote the horizontal dimension of equity in tax systems over vertical equity. Based 
on these goals, tax reform proposals in the region have tended to include the following elements:  
 
(i) Implementation of broad-based and uniform VAT systems to replace taxes on foreign trade and 
cascading turnover taxes. 
(ii) Reduction of the highest statutory tax rates and simplification of the personal income tax system. 
(iii) Elimination of preferential treatment for particular sources of corporate income and particular 
economic sectors. 
(iv) Modernisation and strengthening of the institutions involved in tax administration. 
(v) Increased use of presumptive taxation on capital earnings based on the net or gross values of assets. 
(vi) Wider use of withholding taxes, current or advance payment systems, and adjustments for inflation, 
tax credits and debits in order to moderate the Olivera-Tanzi effect by which inflation erodes the 
value of taxes. 
 
The change in the substance of tax reform proposals was the outcome of a major shift in normative 
principles and theoretical approaches to taxation as well as changing ideas about the development role of 
the state. More specifically, observers became extremely sceptical of the capacity of governments to use 
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tax policy to intentionally privilege certain sectors, alter the economic behaviour of labour or business, or 
redistribute wealth (Bird 1992). Instead, interventionist tax policy was replaced by a faith in markets and 
an emphasis on macroeconomic stability (Perry and Herrera 1994).  
The new agenda emerged in the face of fiscal crisis, government incapacity, and stagnating 
economies. Observers were convinced that tax systems needed to raise more revenues, operate more 
simply and neutrally, and allow greater international economic integration (Tanzi 1992).30 The immediate 
need was to deal with runaway inflation. Governments sought reforms that would both counteract it and 
keep revenues buoyant in the face of variable inflation rates (Jenkins 1995). In particular, inflation 
encouraged the increased use of withholding taxes, current/advance payment systems, adjustments for 
inflation, and tax credits or debits.  
Some of the longer-term responses to economic stagnation, such as trade liberalisation, created 
difficulties for fiscal adjustment (Toye 2000). Decreasing trade tax revenues meant that countries would 
have to recover tax capacity where it had been lost or increase it where it never existed. This became even 
more necessary as international capital markets demanded fiscal surplus to guarantee creditworthiness 
(Perry and Herrera 1994). Governments were encouraged to increase domestic sources of indirect tax, in 
particular through VAT. Such taxes were written into trade agreements and have been attached as 
conditions to structural adjustment loans (Shome 1992). 
The advice on direct taxes focused on broadening the base by eliminating incentives and exceptions 
while bringing down high marginal rates that encouraged avoidance and evasion.31 These policies held out 
the promise of increasing overall revenues while also simplifying administration (Shome 1992) and being 
relatively neutral with respect to market signals (Tanzi 1992). Many assessments of previously progressive 
rate structures suggest they performed poorly (Bird 1992; Tanzi 1992). To the extent that governments 
and external observers did have a serious concern with equity issues, they tended to stress the value of 
increasing revenues to combat inflation, which was considered an “inflationary tax” that hit the poorest 
most directly (Cardoso 1992). Governments were advised that, having conquered inflation, they could 
seek progressivity on the expenditure side of the ledger (IDB 1998a). Only further down the line, when 
both of these had been achieved, could countries use tax structure to redistribute income. ‘At this stage, 
the pursuit of income redistribution should take a backstage position to revenue generation. In more 
normal times, governments if they wish, could bring this objective forward once again’ (Tanzi 1992).32 
                                                 
30  ‘Tax reforms or cuts in noninterest expenditure that leave a “primary surplus” large enough to meet the foreign 
obligations are highly desirable’ (Tanzi 1992: 646). 
31  Incentives took a variety of forms, including reduced rates, tax holidays, depreciation allowance schemes and 
other exemptions. Some of these were defensible from an optimal taxation perspective. 
32  ‘It is often argued that equity and even efficiency considerations require differential tax rates so that by 
advocating simplicity and, to a large extent, statutory proportionality, one abandons the objectives of equity and 
efficiency. The truth is that in most Latin American countries statutory progressivity for the income tax and 
highly differentiated rates for the other taxes (sales taxes, import duties) have not resulted in particularly 
equitable or efficient tax systems. What they have done is create many administrative headaches. And, of 
course, if they have reduced the ability of the government to raise tax levels, they may have hurt just the people 
they wanted to help through inflation, economic instability, and so forth’ (Tanzi 1992: 654). 
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International advisors increasingly emphasised the importance of a tax regime that could be 
implemented effectively in conditions of weak capacity in the taxation agencies (Shome 1999).33 Simplified 
direct taxes and broad-based VAT were attractive for this reason. Weak tax administration in some Latin 
American countries has also been addressed with the creation of institutes for training tax officials, the 
adoption of wage incentives for tax administration personnel, the use of banking infrastructure to collect 
taxes, automated and systematised information systems, and the creation of special taxpayers units to 
monitor and collect taxes from the largest taxpayers (Rodriguez 1993; IDB 1996). 
The 1990s have been a period of greater international economic integration, reflecting multilateral 
trade and financial liberalisation coupled with a regional trend towards deep trade integration (Barreix and 
Villela 2003).34 Some Latin American countries have made arrangements with developed country partners, 
such as Mexico’s entrance into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). These trends have 
brought tax harmonisation issues to the foreground. Even countries that have not yet signed agreements 
are looking forward to integrating with the US, their main trade partner, by incorporating into their tax 
structures elements of the 1986 and more recent US tax reforms.  
International economic integration, in particular, raises the issue of international tax coordination. As 
more countries lower financial and trade barriers, the competition to secure international investment 
intensifies. Countries can be caught in a race to the bottom in which they cut taxes, especially on mobile 
capital, and are forced to cut spending (often social spending) or offer regressive tax holidays (Barreix and 
Villela 2003). Attempts to coordinate tax rates across borders are difficult, yet they have been included in 
regional trade agreements such as Mercosur. Although more information is required, it seems clear that 
trade integration and tax harmonisation will have differential impacts depending on starting positions of 
different states. In small, Caribbean and Central American states, trade taxes have been the principal 
sources of revenue, and trade integration and tax harmonisation require significant changes in tax  
structure and  revenue  sources.  In larger,  and more  developed  Latin American  countries,  taxes on 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘Latin America has a long history of attempting to make the tax structure more progressive. In doing so, it has 
severely limited its tax capacity, cutting down the resources the government can appropriate to promote its 
social agenda and maintain macroeconomic balance. It is much easier to achieve progressive spending than 
progressive taxation. After all, the top decile of the population uses neither the health nor basic education 
services provided by the government. Latin America has been able to collect more revenue from a relatively flat 
income tax than it used to collect from rapidly rising marginal tax rates. Value-added taxes with a broad base 
and few exceptions perform far better than those that exclude goods in order to make them more progressive. 
In this context, tax systems in the region would be far more progressive if collection were improved. The best 
way to improve the distributive power of fiscal policy would be to make tax administration more efficient and 
evasion more difficult by adopting simple tax structures’ (IDB 1998a). 
33  It was in this context that Bird and Casanegra (1992) wrote that in ‘developing countries tax administration is 
tax policy’. The same perception led Shome (1999) to observe that: ‘Complex tax policy makes it difficult for 
tax administrators to interpret and implement their provisions. As a result they tend to simplify the tax code 
increasing, the distance from the original design and intent behind the law. Once the tax structure is simplified, 
it should be obvious that tax administrators would be justified to further simplify practices for administrative 
convenience only under extraordinary circumstances.’ 
34  Latin America and the Caribbean have four main sub-regional economic blocs: Mercosur, the Andean 
Community, the Central American Common Market and the Caribbean Community. All are formally aimed at 
creating common markets or communities. 
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imports and exports provided revenues, but were more important for their protectionist functions. In 
these countries, eliminating trade taxes is more consequential for economic policy and structure than for 
fiscal reasons.  
In short, the Latin American approach to tax reform over the last two decades has focused on 
improving administration; macroeconomic management; and making tax structures simpler, more neutral, 
and better suited to international economic integration. Equity and directing investment have mostly been 
left to other policy instruments.  
 
3.2 Tax reform projects supported by international financial institutions 
These reforms took place while – and partly as a result of – the more active interest of international 
financial institutions (IFIs) in tax reform issues in developing countries. The World Bank started to 
incorporate tax policy and administration in its menu of fiscal adjustment advice. IMF technical assistance 
on taxation became more closely linked with its numerous adjustment and lending programmes, and it 
placed greater emphasis on administration and implementation. Regional development banks, such as the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), also increased their financing of tax reform projects (Goode 
1993).  
Although the influence of IFIs in the design and implementation of tax reform projects in 
developing countries has been widely acknowledged, there have been few attempts to explicitly map their 
actions in Latin America. Their interventions in the region are usually referred to only indirectly in broader 
studies of developing countries as a whole (Goode 1993; Stewart 2002). Part of the difficulty in identifying 
and mapping tax activities has to do with diffuse and uncoordinated practices between and within 
departments and operational areas: 
 
The process of identifying and mapping the tax reform activities of these institutions [IFIs] has not 
always been easy, as tax reform is one of the least visible aspects of their work. Many of the 
institutions have more than one department or operational area that works on tax reform or policy 
and sometimes there seems to have been little or no apparent communication between the different 
departments. A further difficulty is that tax reform is often conducted as technical assistance and 
even in the new climate of transparency, there is continued secrecy regarding technical assistance. 
(Stewart 2002: 8) 
 
Recently, efforts have been made to clarify who is doing what among the IFIs and to avoid repetition, 
share best practices, and coordinate technical assistance. In particular, an International Tax Dialogue 
(ITD) has been created among staff of the Tax Policy and Administration Thematic Group in the World 
Bank, the Fiscal Affairs Department in the IMF and the OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration 
(International Monetary Fund 2002b). It offers an incipient mechanism of cooperation, though it has yet 
to gain the buy-in of member governments. 
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Overall, the activities of international institutions with respect to tax reform can be classified into the 
following: (a) collecting and disseminating economic and tax system data; (b) making forecasts on 
economic progress, tax trends and tax revenues; (c) analysing tax policy issues and producing publications 
and working papers; (d) setting targets and recommendations for economic growth and tax reform; 
(e) creating, supervising and enforcing rules on economic and taxation issues, including treaties or 
conditions of membership; (f) maintaining fora for negotiations, such as committees on tax issues; 
(g) attaching tax reform conditions to financial assistance, loans or aid; and (h) providing technical 
assistance and education on tax (Stewart 2002).  
Though the IFIs have replicated activities to some degree, some differences in their emphases in the 
region can be detected. The World Bank record in the 1990s is documented in Barbone et al. (1999). Of 
about 120 lending operations with components to strengthen some aspect of the tax system, 83 projects 
disbursed US$3.8 billion on major tax or customs administration reform. Only in 37 of these loans were 
tax system reforms a component of a broader structural reform programme. Among the 83 projects in 
which tax features centrally, customs reform components were the most frequent. Tax administration 
reform predominated in technical assistance loans. Of special interest was the attention given to the VAT 
in tax structure. Concerns about tax administration were pre-eminent in 43 loans. This emphasis was 
justified in terms of revenue enhancement (40 per cent of cases), strengthening administrative institutions 
(37 per cent) and promoting macroeconomic stability and growth (28 per cent). Improving accountability 
and taxpayer education and services were major objectives in very few operations (7 per cent and 5 per 
cent respectively), and no project had a major focus on strengthening the voice or participation of 
taxpayers. There was a gradual shift in World Bank projects from Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa 
to Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and a decline in the total outlay from US$5.1 billion during 1990–94 
to US$3.6 billion during 1995–1998. Of the 83 projects with a tax system component, 18 took place in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, amounting to 23 per cent of all projects and 26 per cent of the total 
loans disbursed. 
The trend in the pattern of the IMF’s tax activities was similar, though a few differences emerge. In 
the aftermath of the debt crisis in the region, the IMF influence on tax policy and administration was 
particularly strong. Closely linked to structural adjustment loans (SAF/ESAF), technical assistance relating 
to taxation was largely the remit of the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD).35 This department developed tax 
reform  recommendations  to be included in  Letters of Intent  signed by borrowers  and produced regular 
                                                 
35  The ESAF was renamed the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility in 1999 (IMF 2002b). 
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country reports that broadly surveyed tax policies (Stewart 2002). The impact of IMF policy advice was 
significant, as shown by a close match between tax elements in SAF/ESAF programmes and policies 
proposed and often implemented in the region (Abed et al. 1998).36  
Like the World Bank and IMF, the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB) has also been playing a 
role in tax policy in the region, in particular its (now abolished) Fiscal Division (IDB 1998b). Most of the 
IDB-funded programmes targeted tax administration reform, though some have included technical 
support for tax policies. Such tax policy programmes mostly aimed at simplifying tax systems and 
eliminating taxes with low yield. They were implemented in Peru, Ecuador and Suriname, among other 
countries. In tax administration, IDB-supported programmes have included: (a) the development of 
organisational and human resources, (b) revenue collection and information systems, (c) taxpayer 
compliance activities, and (d) developing taxpayer assistance facilities. Organisational and human resource 
programmes supported the creation of institutes for training tax officials, the adoption of wage incentives, 
and career plans for tax administration personnel.37 Revenue collection programmes focused on 
developing reliable taxpayer identification systems, unifying taxpayer accounts, creating special units for 
larger taxpayers, and using the banking system for collection purposes. On compliance, partial audits 
focused on specific taxes with randomly selected contributors as a way to eliminate the discretion of tax 
officials. At the same time, programmes also touched on taxpayers’ rights and created ombudsman units 
for taxpayers.  
A few factors limited the impact of the IDB in the region. First, its specialised fiscal division was 
abolished in 2000. Second, the IDB’s country project cycle explicitly links to political/election cycles to 
help borrower governments to control their own policy agendas. This emphasis on the shorter-term 
electoral cycle may increase an already high attention to issues of fiscal balance, and deflect attention from 
longer-run and politically sensitive issues such as poverty and inequality. Despite these constraints, the 
IDB demonstrated significant influence and identified a series of areas for future attention: (a) improving 
audit and control units; (b) designing tax harmonisation agreements; (c) devising effective legal sanctions 
against evasion; (d) modernising municipal tax administration; and (e) strengthening institutions 
responsible for internal and external monitoring and oversight. 
 
                                                 
36  ‘Tax policy reforms [included in SAF/ESAF] programmes typically included key elements from the among the 
following measures: introducing or strengthening the broad-based consumption tax, notably a VAT, . . . setting 
import tariffs at a moderate low average rate, . . . reforming the structure of the personal income tax through 
the introduction of limited personal exemptions, a moderate top marginal tax rate, an overall exemption limit 
that excludes people with modest income, . . . an extensive use of final withholding’ (Abed et al. 1998: 10). 
37  In an evaluation of Brazil’s adoption of performance-based wages in tax collection, Kahn et al. (2001) observed 
a sharp increase in fine collections despite a decrease in the total number of auditors employed by the tax 
collection agency. The authors are quick to point, however, the dangers that such schemes may induce tax 
collectors in the promotion of extortionary practices. 
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4  Evaluating the reforms  
To evaluate the impact of the tax reforms during the decade, it is first necessary to note two things. First, 
not all reforms have been implemented, and second, the region continues to suffer serious developmental 
problems. Inflation rates fell to an average of 10 per cent – but recently have started to rise again. 
Economic growth has been mildly positive, but it has been limited to some countries and periods and has 
been far below the 5 per cent overall level observed in previous decades. Poverty and inequality persist, 
with extreme poverty in some countries and increasing inequality across the region. Tax reforms have 
clearly not been a silver bullet. On the other hand, reforms have not been implemented consistently and 
perhaps should not bear the blame. 
 
4.1 Implementation 
The reforms in tax administration were implemented more consistently than others. A proliferation of 
programmes included staff training, establishing career structures, introducing modern information 
technology, and revising procedures and internal organisation. Collection of taxes through banks was 
adopted everywhere, as well as internal organisation by functions (collection, inspection, control, large 
taxpayer units, etc) instead of the traditional tax base by tax base approach (IDB 1997; Barreix and Villela 
2003). 
In the tax policy area, projects supported by IFIs achieved most between 1989 and 1994 (Lora and 
Panizza 2002). This early period saw two policies generally well implemented: (i) reducing taxes on foreign 
trade and (ii) reducing high marginal income tax rates for both individuals and businesses: 
 
• Taxes on foreign trade, which in 1980 represented 30 per cent of all taxes in the average country in 
the region, were partially replaced by domestic taxes, to the point where trade taxes now generate 
only 17 per cent of revenue collected (IDB 1997). Trade taxes, however, still account for the largest 
share of tax revenue, and over half of the total tax take, in Eastern Caribbean countries (CEPAL 
1999), and are the third major source of revenue in Central America (Stotsky and Wolde-Mariam 
2002). 
• Top marginal income tax rates fell from an average of 50 per cent in 1985–86 to 34 per cent in 1997, 
a rate of decline considerably more rapid than in the OECD. The same happened with corporate 
income taxes, which declined from an average of 37 per cent in 1986 to 28 per cent in 1997 (Shome 
1999). 
 
Other tax reform proposals, particularly those geared towards streamlining tax regimes, eliminating 
exemptions, or broadening the tax base were less consistently implemented. In fact, some studies have 
identified a “drift” in tax reform around the mid-1990s (Shome 1999; Barreix and Villela 2003). Many 
reforms were not implemented, reversed, or watered down. For example, though marginal rates on upper 
incomes came down, attempts to widen bases were blocked. In addition, turnover taxes that provided 
revenues for fiscal adjustment were left in place, even as they violated principles of microeconomic 
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efficiency. Some taxes were implemented but reversed in the face of external pressure, such as 
presumptive income taxes that were moderate revenue raisers but were opposed by foreign investors. 
Finally, even where income taxes were broadened, they were often crammed full of exemptions by 
powerful interests. In fact, personal exemptions increased from 1.29 per cent of GDP in 1991 to 1.36 per 
cent in 1997 (Shome 1999). 
Reforms in the Brazilian indirect tax system in the 1990s offer a good example of a number of these 
trends. After its 1967 Constitutional Tax Reform, Brazil became one of the first countries to centre its 
consumption tax system on value-added taxes. Nevertheless, Brazil’s VAT grew increasingly complex with 
a narrow base, several exempted goods, and multiple rates. Reliance on turnover and other cascading 
forms of taxation have also started to increase. Successive proposals to replace cascading and turnover 
taxes by a broader and more uniform VAT have been dismissed.  
Several factors may explain inconsistent implementation. In the Brazilian example, a number of 
studies have highlighted the role of fiscally-strapped subnational governments that defend their few tax 
bases (Werneck 2000; Lledo 2001). More generally, reforms faced stumbling blocks at multiple veto 
points, including subnational governments and also opposition parties, fragmented legislatures, and slowly 
moving judiciaries. As could be expected, international actors and powerful local interests also resisted 
attempts to tax their income and wealth. Work continues on political obstacles to reform. In particular, 
policymakers are exploring what are “politically” as opposed to “economically” optimal reforms. Like 
optimal tax theory that takes into account administrative costs in assessing reforms, political optimality 
can assess reforms once veto players and institutional constraints are taken into account. Any such 
exercise must necessarily consider the impact of reforms.  
 
4.2 Impacts 
The degree and direction of reform impacts depends in part on whose study one believes. For some 
commentators, reforms are associated with growth and stability. For a sample of 17 Latin American 
countries, Escaith and Morley (2001) found that tax reforms had a positive and significant impact on 
economic growth, and the IDB calculated a 0.2 percentage point increase in growth in reforming 
countries (IDB 1997). The latter study also found a 15 per cent reduction in the volatility of the fiscal 
deficit and a slight improvement in income distribution. 
In contrast to these relatively positive evaluations, Behrman et al. (2000) and Morley (2000) 
concluded that tax reforms widened wage inequality in particular. Marginal tax rates were lowered for 
higher income segments and businesses while value-added taxes hit consumption in particularly regressive 
ways. Tax exemptions for basic goods were eliminated, and taxes on luxury consumption were lowered. In 
addition, the elimination of special incentives for import-substituting industries and high job-creation 
businesses or activities hit mostly those who depended on wage labour.  
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5  Latin American contributions: policy innovations and institutional 
reforms 
The strong influence of IFIs on the nature and substance of tax reform projects during the late 1980s and 
most of the 1990s has not prevented Latin American governments from designing and implementing their 
own “indigenous” tax reforms. Regional government intervention was important for three important 
reasons. These indigenous reforms were a reaction to institutional and structural problems that were to 
some degree inherently Latin American. They frequently have addressed issues left untouched by IFI-
inspired tax reform projects, especially the progressivity of tax regimes and the accountability of people 
involved in tax policy design and administration. And they have been innovative, involving changes in tax 
policy and institutions that have not yet been tried in most industrial countries.  
Particular challenges facing Latin American governments made the region a likely site for new 
experiments in tax policy and tax institutions (Tanzi 2000). Chief among the obstacles were (a) vast 
structural inequality and a related inability or unwillingness to exploit traditional forms of direct taxation 
such as those on income and property, (b) administrative difficulties of taxing a large informal sector, 
(c) highly inflationary environments, (d) strong pressure for additional tax revenues for fiscal adjustment 
purposes, and (e) weak social contracts and institutions of governance. These attributes, while specifically 
Latin American, also afflict other developing countries, and even some developed ones. As a result, 
disseminating these innovations serves as a useful complement to current conventional thinking on tax. 
 
5.1 Tax policies  
The first set of innovations employed tax policy changes to resolve specific problems. Six have received 
coverage in the tax literature and will be addressed below: (a) the taxation of gross assets, (b) simplified 
taxation schemes levied on small firms, (c) the taxation of land value improvements (land value capture), 
(d) the taxation of bank account transactions, (e) the (implicit) taxation of foreign capital inflows, and 
(f) environmental taxation.  
 
5.1.1 Gross asset taxes 
A tax on the gross assets of enterprises and individuals that engage in business activities was first adopted 
in Mexico in 1988 and subsequently introduced in Argentina, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Venezuela 
(Tanzi 2000). Sadka and Tanzi (1992) have conducted a comprehensive analysis of the tax on gross assets, 
its origins and properties. According to them ‘there have been two basic reasons for the introduction of 
this tax in Latin America: first, the need for additional revenue in countries undergoing major adjustment 
programmes; second, the realisation that traditional taxes on the income of enterprises do not fare well in 
situations of substantial inflation’ (Sadka and Tanzi 1992: 1).  
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A critical element in the design of gross asset tax is the choice of tax base and method used in its 
valuation.38 The gross asset tax is generally imposed on a taxpayer’s gross business assets, which includes 
both current and long-term assets. Current assets may include cash, securities and inventories, while long-
term assets comprise mostly land and other fixed assets. The “gross” denomination stems for the 
inclusion of debt-financed assets in the tax base as opposed to net asset taxes levied only on equity 
financed assets.39 In administrative and compliance terms, this base has proved appropriate to an 
inflationary environment. High inflation allows companies to convert real positive profits, via nominal 
interest rate deductions, into reported losses for tax purposes. Tax avoidance is compounded as those 
losses may be carried on to the future, reducing a company’s net worth and tax liabilities.40 The gross asset 
tax eliminates this problem by including payments on debt principal and interest. 
The advantages of a tax on gross assets go beyond their administrative effectiveness in tackling tax 
avoidance in inflationary environments. Sadka and Tanzi argue that gross assets may be a better proxy of 
the normal or average income flow generated by an individual or firm than the actual individual or corporate 
income reported yearly for tax purposes.41 The presumptive and distinctive nature of the gross asset tax 
may also lead it to function in an equitable way. Standard forms of capital or corporate taxation are levied 
on actual income. This creates disincentives to work and save, generating deadweight losses.42 Taxation on 
gross assets creates incentives for their owners to use them productively, hopefully to the general social 
advantage. More important, the capacity to avoid tax through stated losses associated with inflation is 
highly dependent on asset value, thus largely benefiting the wealthy. The gross asset tax can also be made 
more progressive by exempting small taxpayers. 
Whether the gross asset tax should be implemented in Latin America as a minimum income tax, as a 
complement to it, or as a replacement for tax on income from capital will depend on the effectiveness of 
other taxes. Also, it will depend on the ability of Latin American governments to agree tax treaties with 
industrial countries in which a tax on gross assets could be accepted as a final tax on actual income. Unless 
such treaties are signed, firms investing in the region would not be entitled to tax credits against foreign 
taxes, and would be double taxed in those countries that levied gross asset taxes. 
                                                 
38  See Krelove and Stotsky (1995) for a succinct exposition of issues involving the design of different forms of 
asset taxation.  
39  The neutrality of gross asset taxes regarding corporate financing decisions is usually suggested as another 
potential advantage of this form of asset taxation (Krelove and Stotsky 1995; Sadka and Tanzi 1992). The lack 
of liquidity in security markets and the dominance of debt as the main source of corporate finance in Latin 
America emerge as more practical reasons. 
40  Adjusting assets by smaller inflation indexes than those used on the liability side is a possible and more explicit 
way. See Sadka (1991) for a more complete treatment of distortions imposed on corporate balance sheets in 
high inflationary environments. 
41  ‘Indeed, economic theory suggests that the market value of the firm’s assets is equal to the net present value of 
the future (after tax) cash flows generated by these assets. That is, the market value of the assets reflects more 
the high “true” profits to be generated by them, rather than the low profits or even losses reported for tax 
purposes’ (Sadka and Tanzi 1992: 9).  
42  Unless they are exempted, a tax on gross assets may not alleviate poverty if initial endowments for those in the 
bottom of the actual income distribution are so small that they cannot rise above the poverty line even when a 
maximum effort is exerted. 
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The gross asset tax has proved particularly successful in Mexico even as standard capital income 
taxes or taxes on net worth exhibited substantial declines in other Latin American countries during the 
1990s (Shome 1999). The Mexican tax base included all types of corporate assets, adjusted for inflation, 
with no deduction allowed for debt (thus its gross nature). This base was taxed at a rate of 2 per cent, was 
allowable against the corporate income tax (minimum income tax), and exempted financial institutions 
and small taxpayers (Thirsk 1997: 318). In light of the apparent virtues of the gross asset tax and the 
challenges in the design and valuation of its base, future work should be devoted to examining its 
administrative and political feasibility. Studies of the Mexican case should prove illuminating. 
 
5.1.2 Taxation of small firms 
Over the last two decades, several Latin American countries have introduced simplified taxation schemes 
for small firms. Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Paraguay have 
implemented presumptive taxes for small taxpayers that (a) are levied on gross corporate revenues and (b) 
substitute either for VAT or income tax. Other Latin American countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil and Peru went further by creating a unique tax levied on small enterprises that replaces more than 
one of the major taxes (VAT, income, and social security taxes) (Tanzi 2000).  
Such schemes were designed to reduce the compliance costs of small enterprises, which often lack 
the economies of scale and the technical capacity to assess and fulfil their tax liabilities under the 
conventional tax system. In particular, the gross revenue tax base entails less valuation problems than 
standard taxes on corporate income and even presumptive income taxes on assets. The simplicity of such 
a tax has helped reduce the costs of monitoring and collecting revenue from small firms, which have 
usually been large relative to the revenue potential. Another objective of these new forms of tax was to 
lower the attractions of operating in the informal sector. 
Argentina’s Monotributo and Brazil’s Simples are recent examples of simplified taxes aimed at replacing 
several taxes.43 A study conducted by Brazil’s Internal Revenue Service tracked a group of small 
enterprises which were active in 1996 and which in 1997 opted for the Simples (Brazil, Secretariat of 
Federal Revenues 2000). Initial estimates revealed a reduction of 90 million Reals in the costs involved in 
receiving and processing their tax files. The same set of firms has created 500,000 new jobs – perhaps 
most importantly, these are now in the formal sector. 
 
5.1.3 Land value capture 
The extremely unequal distribution of property in Latin America has always made both ownership and 
taxation contentious. However, in recent years some Latin American countries have started to discuss the 
implementation of a particular type of tax on land, commonly referred in the literature as land value 
                                                 
43  Brazil’s Simples was implemented in 1996 with Argentina’s Monotributo introduced two years later. 
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capture (recuperacion de plusvalias in Spanish). Land value capture corresponds to the taxation of land value 
increments that result from direct or indirect public action (e.g. public infrastructure investments).44  
The taxation of land value increments goes back to the 1920s in countries such as Brazil and 
Colombia (Smolka and Furtado 2002). In its recent reincarnation, the debate has been centred on the 
taxation of urban property. Large Latin American cities such as Sao Paulo, Santiago and Bogota have 
started to implement or reinforce the use of land value capture mechanisms (Smolka and Furtado 2001). 
The city of Mexicali, capital of the Mexican state of Baja California, successfully replaced the traditional 
property tax, based on the combined value of land and buildings, by a tax exclusively on land value (Perlo 
1999). 
The growing popularity of land value capture in Latin America has less to do with its long-recognised 
efficiency and equity properties than with the increasing fiscal and political pressures for revenue 
mobilisation at the local level.45 Fiscal and administrative decentralisation has given urban administrations 
more spending responsibilities, and democratisation has increased the demands placed on them. As a 
result, they have looked for revenue sources beyond historically ineffective property taxes (Smolka and 
Furtado 2002).  
The degree of progressivity of such taxes depends mostly on the pattern of use of the revenues 
collected. If they are earmarked only for the contributing community, they may increase spatial socio-
economic disparities. If, however, jurisdictions are able to shift revenues from areas with high value public 
investment to areas that require greater public infrastructure, the potential for progressivity is significant 
(Furtado 2000).  
 
5.1.4 Bank debit taxes 
A tax on banking transactions, mainly on debits, was originally introduced in Argentina in 1983. It was 
reintroduced there in 1988 and 2001, and implemented in Peru (1989), Brazil (1994 and 1997), Venezuela 
(1994 and 1998), Colombia (1998), and Ecuador (1999).  
Bank debit taxes (BDTs) are a subset of financial transaction taxes, which are taxes levied on each 
instance of specified banking, equity, currency, securities, or other financial dealings. Bank debit taxes, in 
particular, are levied on withdrawals from or other debits to bank accounts, generally including the 
clearance of cheques, cash withdrawals, payment of loan proceeds, withdrawals through ATMs and 
charges to bank-issued credit cards (Coelho et al. 2001).  
                                                 
44  Land value capture can also be achieved through non-fiscal instruments such as the private beneficiary 
undertaking on-site improvements that benefits other community residents. 
45  The equity and efficiency properties of land value capture have been first advocated by the nineteenth century 
economist Henry George. See Brown (1997) for a recent compilation of Henry George’s original insights. Even 
though there has been some debate on the generality of Henry George’s propositions, the current consensus is 
that, if properly designed, a land tax is always efficient and equitable. The current debate has been centred on 
the administrative effectiveness of optimal land taxes (Netzer 1998). 
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As was the case with other tax policy innovations, governments’ urgent revenue needs have been the 
major reason for the adoption of BDTs in Latin America.46 The tax has also proved to be very popular 
and easy to administer given the consolidated and satisfactory role of banks as collection agents (Tanzi 
2000). Such advantages, along with their ability to target the informal sector and to provide information 
that helps combat tax evasion, have led to enthusiastic endorsement of BDTs by some Latin American tax 
administration officials (Brazil, Secretariat of Federal Revenue 2000). Another point in favour of BDTs is 
their potentially redistributive character. Coelho et al. (2001) argue that the poorest in society are likely to 
be little affected since they typically are not heavy users of the banking system. They warn, however, that 
this conclusion would need to be modified if BDTs result in higher prices for basic goods purchased in 
transactions-intensive retailing outlets. 
Preliminary analyses of the implementation of BDTs in Latin America have revealed their 
administrative effectiveness in raising revenue over the short term. They have been particularly effective in 
raising revenue in Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador – around 1 per cent of GDP. The strong revenue 
performance of the Brazilian BDT has been explained by the modest rate at which it is levied, Brazil’s 
significant degree of financial sophistication, and the relative absence of a tradition of moving financial 
assets offshore (Coelho et al. 2001). The fact that the Brazilian BDT was implemented in a moment of 
extreme crisis when the banking system was fragile may have also played a role.  
Despite the positive properties described above, tax policy experts have remained suspicious about 
the efficiency and long-run macroeconomic effects of taxing banking account debits. That is, perhaps, the 
main reason why BDTs have been adopted as temporary, emergency measures. They are believed to be 
inefficient for a number of reasons: the cumulative and cascading nature of their base; and their potential 
to cause disarticulation in the banking system,47 reduce market liquidity, and generate economic 
distortions48 (Tanzi 2000; Coelho et al. 2001). In addition, some of the revenue benefit of BDTs may be 
offset if they result in increased interest payments on government debt (Albuquerque 2002). 
Additional work is required to evaluate the appropriateness of BDT in Latin America. There is to 
date no study of their impact on income distribution.  
 
5.1.5 Taxation of short-term capital inflows 
Between June 1991 to September 1998, the Central Bank of Chile implemented a series of controls on the 
short-term movement of financial capital. These took the form of an unremunerated reserve requirement 
(URR). The URR was an obligation to hold, at the central bank and for approximately a year, an 
                                                 
46  ‘In all cases, with the exception of Brazil, the bank debit tax was introduced at a time of, and in response to, 
general economic crisis, as an emergency means of raising government revenue’ (Coelho et al. 2001: 9). 
47  BDTs may create incentives to conduct economic transactions outside the banking system with obvious 
implications for weakening the development of financial markets and enlarging the informal economy. 
Statistical evidence of financial disarticulation for the case of Brazil is provided in Albuquerque (2002). 
48  Because BDTs have a cascading or turnover effect, firms have an incentive to integrate vertically, generating 
less specialisation and also perhaps creating a bias against small firms. Albuquerque (2002) evaluates the 
macroeconomic impacts of BDTs. He finds that they have a positive impact on real interest rates and a 
negative impact on the long-run stock of capital. 
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unremunerated reserve proportionate to the total amount of capital inflows. It was thus equivalent to a tax 
that declined over time with the permanence or maturity of the capital inflow. Instead of depositing the 
unremunerated reserve fraction with the Central Bank, foreign investors were allowed to pay the Central 
Bank an up-front fee, which made the tax nature of this device even more explicit. The fee level was 
determined by the relevant foreign interest rate and the fraction of capital subject to the restriction. This 
tax on short-term capital inflows was implemented to improve the capacity of the government to balance 
its external and internal accounts in an environment of limited exchange-rate flexibility. The tax would 
offset the appreciation of currency required for a sustainable current account while keeping the interest 
rate differential in line with a sustainable government budget (Nadal-De Simone and Sorsa 1999). 
Several recent papers have attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of Chile’s capital controls.49 There 
is evidence that URR (a) led to higher domestic interest rates – or at least a larger differential between 
local and international interest rates; (b) altered the composition of capital inflows in favour of medium or 
long-term capital inflows; (c) reduced the overall volume of transborder capital flows in ways that eased 
macroeconomic management (Gallego et al. 2002); and (d) provided an incentive for tax avoidance and 
evasion (Le Fort and Sanhueza 1997). Overall, the impacts on interest rates and on the volatility of capital 
inflows seem to have reduced vulnerability to economic crisis and created incentives for longer-term 
investment. However, the benefits of such controls may be temporary and can only be realised if the 
government or central bank is very active in combating avoidance and evasion. Moreover, it is important 
to keep in mind that the relative success of Chile’s URR may have been due, to a large extent, to the 
strong enforcement capacity of its central bank, to a long tradition of compliance with the law, and to low 
levels of corruption. ‘Chilean-type capital controls could be less effective and in the extreme could lead to 
more corruption in countries with a weaker institutional and legal environment,’ (Gallego et al. 2002: 38).  
 
5.1.6 Environmental taxation 
An innovation that appears to be gaining wider acceptability is the use of tax instruments to modify 
behaviour with respect to the environment. In the case of externalities such as environmental degradation, 
tax instruments can shape incentives to individuals to achieve desired outcomes. The theoretical basis for 
this approach is a classical Pigouvian approach to externalities, in which taxes are levied on units of 
emissions or damage generated by an activity, forcing economic actors to internalise the full social costs of 
their decisions. Other instruments can also be used to shape behaviour: subsidies, fees, deposit-refund 
schemes, tradable permits, regulations, and fines. Among these instruments, taxes originally gained 
popularity because they were believed to provide a double dividend. They offered revenue and more 
effective protection of the environment. By contrast, regulatory and punishment regimes require 
bureaucratic oversight and enforcement (Huber et al. 1998).  
                                                 
49  See Gallego et al. (2002) for a recent survey of the literature. 
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In fact, environmental taxation has also required significant amounts of administrative sophistication 
in setting rates to match the cost of environmental damage, monitoring and measuring impacts, and 
enforcing compliance. Instead, other options that are easier to administer have been tried: e.g. taxes on 
inputs or final goods that are functionally linked to environmental degradation, including petroleum, 
natural resource exploitation, use or pollution of the environment, and waste disposal.50 Honduras has 
experimented with an extremely lucrative petroleum tax as well as taxes on inputs derived from forest 
products. Other attempts to address environmental degradation have not been entirely consistent with 
revenue priorities. Tax relief or credit subsidy schemes have proven relatively effective in modifying 
economic behaviour, but they do not generate revenues, and they demand considerable administrative 
capacity. Local and state governments in Brazil have experimented with “green” property taxes that offer 
incentives to land set aside for environmental protection. 
An issue raised by environmental taxation, relevant to other types of taxation as well, is the 
relationship between the revenues raised and the expenditures made. In some instances, local government 
units administer environmental taxes and target spending on environmental protection. More research is 
required, but it may be the case that linking the tax base to the expenditure target is an especially effective 
mechanism to overcome a number of challenges facing taxation capacity more generally. Such an 
arrangement violates principles of unitary budgeting – as opposed to a budget that is partially subdivided 
into earmarked expenditures. Nevertheless, such practices may generate coalitions of beneficiaries who 
will support taxes politically as well as contribute resources to develop institutional capacity. 
Especially in locally-administered environmental taxation, macroeconomic and equity issues require 
attention. In the context of liberalisation and deregulation, environmental taxation will have to reconcile 
pressures to attract foreign investment and generate revenues. In terms of distribution, environmental 
taxes will have to be examined closely to determine incidence, as producers with market power probably 
pass costs to consumers rather than changing their own behaviour. Also, revenues from environmental 
taxes, especially those administered at the local level, may be difficult to redistribute from rich regions to 
poor or environmentally degraded regions.  
 
5.2 Institutional reforms  
In addition to these rather technical policy innovations, Latin America has been the site of innovations in 
political institutions related to taxation. Of course, institutions reflect in part the demands of civil society 
and the interests of political elites, and are thus difficult to change. Still, it is important to identify and 
encourage those institutional reforms that will support pro-poor tax reforms.  
Latin America is perhaps more commonly known as the site of institutional sickness, rather than 
institutional innovation. Governments in the region, especially outside of the Caribbean, are generally 
characterised by presidentialism and some form of proportional representation in elections to the 
legislature (Shugart and Carey 1992; Linz and Valenzuela 1994). Both characteristics have been associated 
                                                 
50  See Nellor (1995) for a more detailed discussion of different kinds of environmental taxation. 
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with stalemate over reforms and pressures for profligate fiscal behaviour. Presidential government, in 
which the executive must negotiate with an independently elected legislature over fiscal policy, creates an 
immediate veto point over major reforms. Indeed, this check on executive discretion is one of the reasons 
presidentialism originally was adopted. However, at moments where major reforms are necessary, 
presidential systems in Latin America have often been characterised by stalemate and inaction (Haggard 
and Kaufman 1992; Coppedge 1994).  
Stalemates and conflicts in legislatures are exacerbated by weak political party systems. Recent 
transitions to democracy, and electoral rules such as proportional representation and multimember 
districts, have resulted in weak parties and party systems. Parties have been characterised by personalism 
and clientelism, and party systems have been characterised by fragmentation, polarisation, and volatility. 
These attributes, combined with presidentialism, exacerbate the problems of stalemate between executive 
and legislature. In many cases, presidents find the only way to pass legislation is to purchase support from 
legislative allies in the form of spending programmes or tax incentives. These kinds of transactions occur 
in all polities, but, where party systems are weak, the purchase must be made repeatedly. The long term 
fiscal burden tends to be high.  
Building support for reform is difficult, and pro-poor reform presents particular challenges. In some 
ways, this may seem surprising, as the vast majority of Latin Americans are poor, and median voter theory 
suggests that politicians should make appeals to the poor majority of voters. In fact, politicians have had 
success with anti-poor platforms, for example by utilising clientelistic links to the poor or simply by 
excluding poor voters or their representatives from the policy process. In addition, voters have been more 
concerned with other issues, such as inflation or security, and have not prioritised pro-poor policies, 
including pro-poor tax reform. At the current historical juncture, however, we may have a unique 
opportunity to capitalise on local support for income redistribution. Competing policy agendas, such as 
macroeconomic stabilisation, are now less salient, as most countries have committed to relatively sound 
fiscal policies. At the current juncture, policymakers can return to the important work of addressing 
inequality, and political competition may revolve more around these issues. In the context of taxation, this 
means advancing pro-poor institutions and policy. One particular institutional change – in budget 
institutions – has attracted wider attention for focusing on the way in which executives build support for 
changes to taxation and bias outcomes towards pro-poor decisions. 
 
5.2.1 Budgetary institutions 
Recent empirical analysis has explored the role effect of budgetary rules on the fiscal performance of Latin 
American governments (Alesina et al. 1999; Stein et al. 1999). Alesina et al. (1999) uncovered a relationship 
between fiscal deficits and decentralized budgeting institutions. Stein et al. (1999) found similar results for 
other measures of fiscal discipline (smaller spending, lower debt). Budgetary institutions can have an 
independent impact on fiscal performance through the “common-pool” characteristics of public 
budgeting (Weingast et al. 1981). While the common pool of tax revenues pays the costs of public projects, 
the benefits are perceived by specific groups, sectors, or localities. No constituency feels the full cost of 
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any individual spending decision, while a coalition of groups can almost always be created to seek the 
benefits. The resultant bargain creates coalitions that support overspending, but none that will support 
taxation. Institutional solutions to the common-pool problem have been suggested through mechanisms 
to consolidate the incentives to balance costs and benefits of programmes, and mechanisms to prevent 
particularist interests from capturing the budget process by forming a dominant coalition (von Hagen and 
Harden 1995).  
Hierarchy and transparency are the two labels usually associated with these solutions. Hierarchical 
institutions are those in which a centralised unit is responsible for fiscal balance and forced to internalise 
the full costs of benefits. Executives and finance ministries are usually identified as the offices that can 
take both costs and benefits into account. Examples of rules that strengthen the hand of these actors are 
legal limits on the size of deficits, debt ceilings, line item veto, or fiscal targets defined in the context of a 
macroeconomic programme, approved prior to the budget. To protect the budget from capture by special 
interests, institutions of transparency have been suggested. Legislative committees, judicial reviews, and 
citizen oversight, especially through a strong media, are examples of institutions that strengthen 
transparency.  
The move towards more transparent and hierarchical budgetary institutions was pioneered in 
Argentina and Peru. In Argentina, changes in the budget process were formalised by the Law of Financial 
Administration in 1992. Changes included the adoption of quantitative spending limits for different 
ministries at the beginning of the process and the restrictions on the capacity of Congress to propose 
expenditure-enhancing amendments. In Peru, reform took place in the early stages of President Fujimori’s 
term. Changes in this case included elevating the status of the Finance Minister over that of spending 
ministers on budgetary matters, requiring consistency between the budget presented to the legislature and 
the macroeconomic programme, and limiting the power of the Congress to propose amendments to the 
budget (Stein et al. 1999). Similar measures have been adopted more recently in Brazil through the Law of 
Fiscal Responsibility (Tavares et al. 1999). 
 
5.2.2 Participatory budgeting 
Participatory budgeting (PB), surprisingly, may both increase the hierarchical power of the executive and 
increase transparency in implementation. In terms of hierarchy, the PB creates direct authority for the 
executive by stamping the budget with direct popular approval. At the same time, that legitimacy is only 
forthcoming if citizens are truly consulted and able to oversee both budgeting and implementation. Over 
140 Brazilian cities and six states have applied participatory budgeting in some form, and the World Bank 
has become so enamoured of the process that it translated a book on the PB from Portuguese to Spanish 
to distribute it throughout Latin America. Cities in other countries, including Buenos Aires, Montevideo, 
Caracas, San Denis, and Cordoba, have also experimented with participatory budgeting institutions. 
In generic terms, participatory budgeting is a process in which citizens meet in open, public 
assemblies to discuss the public budget. The meetings begin long before the legislative budget cycle, and 
occur as regional and thematic meetings. Participants select investment priorities and elect delegates who 
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continue to meet throughout the year to negotiate the final budget document. To allocate investments, 
planning officials use the priorities decided by the community in a formula which includes a progressive 
element that gives weight to needs (Santos 1998). These plans are incorporated into the budget and then 
passed through the legislature and implemented during the fiscal year. In the following year, budget 
delegates receive a list of the investments and services planned and actually provided, allowing participants 
to evaluate government performance and directly question government officials in public assemblies as 
they design and vote the next year’s budget.  
The taxation side of participatory budgeting has been little studied, although fiscal capacity has been 
acknowledged as central to the success of the idea (Avritzer and Navarro 2003; Abers 2000). Fiscal 
capacity creates room to satisfy demands for investments and provides an incentive for further 
participation. In most cases where participatory budgeting has been implemented, the problem is the weak 
fiscal condition of local jurisdictions. In Brazil, for example, approximately 73 per cent of the 5507 
municipalities have fewer than 20,000 inhabitants, and most small municipalities depend almost 
exclusively on external financial resources (Prud’homme 1998). 
The work of the International Budget Project in Latin America has confirmed that we know less 
about the revenue side than budgeting. CIDE in Mexico has done research, and there are groups looking 
at budgeting and taxation in Costa Rica, but even in these two comparatively advanced countries, the level 
of expertise and knowledge is limited. In Guatemala the Peace Accords of 1996 and the associated (but as 
yet unimplemented) national Fiscal Pact led to some research with FLACSO and local NGOs, but this has 
apparently made little progress in recent years.  
There is increasing acknowledgement that local jurisdictions have significant capacity to mobilise 
resources (Fjeldstad 2001), though political interests and the mobility of capital make it particularly 
difficult to raise taxes, especially progressive rates, at the local level (Schneider 2003). Participatory 
budgeting may, however, enhance local fiscal capacity, increase fiscal progressiveness, and increase 
taxpayer compliance. Indeed, participatory decision-making may be appropriate for mobilising resources 
even at higher-level jurisdictions (Farias 2003). There are several potential links between participation and 
revenue mobilisation. As in early European examples of expanding suffrage and empowering democratic 
institutions, participatory budgeting in Brazil provided greater legitimacy to government. This legitimacy 
was used to justify increasing tax rates (Fedozzi 2000). After taxpayers were granted more direct political 
influence and more information about public expenditures, their evaluations of government probity 
increased, and non-compliance decreased (Abers 1998). In addition, because of the disproportionate 
representation of poor citizens in the budget meetings, new taxes included elements of progressivity 
(Marquetti 2000). 
 
5.2.3 Intergovernmental revenue-sharing arrangements 
Local governments are a significant, but oft forgotten, component of the revenue structure. Their 
importance is not simply limited to the revenues they raise, which are usually insufficient (Fjeldstad 2001). 
Local government has increased in importance in the context of recent democratisation and 
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decentralisation in Latin America. Both processes increased citizen pressure for greater spending by local 
governments. Actors at the centre also increasingly directed their attention to local spending as they 
sought local political support. Further, the retreat of the central state from many areas as a result of fiscal 
adjustment created gaps in service that local governments were often expected to fill. Even before such 
demands intensified, most local jurisdictions could not cover their expenses. Most continue to depend on 
transfers from the central government. 
Revenue sharing has long been an important part of intergovernmental fiscal relations in large 
countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico. Revenue-sharing arrangements 
have been designed to correct unequal provision of services across regions, and inequality between the 
revenues available to a jurisdiction and the expenditures it was expected to meet. These arrangements 
were often reformed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, partly with the objective of compensating for the 
low revenue mobilisation of local governments (Fjeldstad 2001). Often, the reforms were designed to 
expand the bases of the central taxes that were the source of the transfers and increase the portion of the 
income that was to be transferred downward. Municipalities in Brazil and Colombia and provinces in 
Argentina were the major beneficiaries of such reforms. Fiscal pressure at the central level led to a partial 
reversal of some of the reforms and to the creation of alternative taxes at the central level that were not 
subject to sharing. In Argentina, between 1992 and 1994 the federal government managed to reduce the 
provincial share of co-participation funds by 15 per cent. In Brazil, the mechanism of revenue-sharing was 
amended in 1994 to reduce the number of federal taxes shared with states and municipalities, and the 
central government initiated new taxes that were not shared. 
These reforms spurred an important debate about appropriate design. Revenue-sharing has been 
traditionally regarded in the theoretical literature as an appropriate mechanism to correct vertical and 
horizontal imbalances (Oates 1972). Legal or constitutional (as in Brazil and Colombia) rules for the 
division of revenues provide subnational governments a degree of predictability that is important for their 
budgetary planning (Ter-Minassian 1997). Rules-based revenue-sharing systems have also been advocated 
for equity reasons. The unconditional and pre-established nature of disbursal, if complemented by 
progressive formulas, allows for a more equitable distribution of tax resources across jurisdictions and is 
relatively immune from political pressures from wealthy regions (Bradford and Oates 1971). 
Revenue-sharing is not, however, without pitfalls. It drives a wedge between expenditure and revenue 
sources in subnational jurisdictions, and thereby exacerbates the common-pool nature of central 
government budgets. As a result, if a large share of subnational spending is financed through revenue-
sharing, subnational governments may face the incentive to under-exploit their own tax base and focus on 
obtaining more revenue from above, possibly using overspending by to force the hand of central 
government. Econometric analyses of Argentine provinces (Jones et al. 2000), Brazilian states (Blanco 
1998) and Colombian municipalities (Lozano 1999) provide evidence of this type of behaviour. 
Rigid revenue-sharing arrangements, with automatic transfers, can be problematic from a perspective 
of macro-economic management. Every time central government raises taxes to improve its own fiscal 
balance, subnational governments receive additional revenue, and might use that to undermine efforts at 
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fiscal adjustment (Dillinger and Webb 1999; Ter-Minassian 1997). In Brazil, this mechanism induced the 
central government to shift its tax effort away from more efficient but shared taxes, such as VAT and 
income taxes toward less efficient non-shared cascading and turnover taxes (Viol 1999). 
Revenue-sharing arrangements in Brazil and Mexico have also been criticised for failure to promote 
fiscal equalisation, because of the low weights assigned to regional per capita income and other 
development indicators in revenue-sharing formulas (Kraemer 1997). There is also evidence that electoral, 
partisan and other political factors play an important role in determining the regional distribution of 
transfers. In Brazil and Argentina the spatial representation pattern in Congress was the most important 
determinant of the distribution of transfers among states and provinces. Over-represented states or 
provinces received a larger volume of transfers per capita regardless of their development level (Porto and 
Sanguinetti 2001). An analogous partisan pattern was observed in Mexico (Kraemer 1997).  
In short, at least among the cases studied, reforms in revenue-sharing arrangements to induce greater 
automaticity have compromised the efficiency and macroeconomic capacity of the tax system. Moreover, 
the arrangements have not fully met the objectives of vertical or, most importantly, horizontal fiscal 
equity. To the extent that fiscal equalisation may be an important pre-condition for the effective 
implementation of decentralised welfare or anti-poverty programmes, a more pro-poor tax reform should 
take a closer look at the design of revenue sharing systems. 
 
6  Some conclusions 
 
6.1 IFI policy and Latin American reforms 
Latin America is a middle income region that includes significant pockets of industrial development and a 
number of poor countries. Prevalent socioeconomic characteristics include severe inequality, significant 
poverty, a large informal sector, and a large rural sector of concentrated property ownership. 
Administratively, many governments are corrupt and inefficient, though isolated agencies periodically 
show evidence of capacity. Governments have faced persistent fiscal crisis and inability to sustain growth 
and stability after the debt crisis of the 1980s. Politically, most of the region has presidential systems, 
although some Caribbean countries inherited parliamentary institutions. Almost all countries are 
democratic, although political parties remain clientelistic, party systems are fragmented and at times 
polarised, and civil society is weakly organised aside from a few important social movements. In sum, 
much of Latin America lacks a social contract constructed around inclusive political institutions and 
development strategies, and institutionalised in tax and fiscal systems.  
The Latin American approach to tax reform in the 1990s has focused on improving administration 
and macroeconomic capacity, with some attention to microeconomic efficiency. In particular, reforms 
aimed to produce efficient and effective administrations that could implement simplified and neutral tax 
structures with enhanced revenue capacity. These emphases targeted distortions in market and 
macroeconomic performance, administrative incapacity, and failed attempts to use taxation to stimulate 
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industrialisation and distribution. Attention to equity under current reforms has been limited to horizontal 
equity, with vertical equity treated only indirectly through improved administration, low inflation, and 
well-targeted expenditure programmes.  
The above agenda has been advanced by international financial institutions (IFIs). Despite broad 
agreement on policies, IFIs have not coordinated their own activities closely. There have been recent 
efforts to develop a more cooperative and systematic approach. Still, certain areas of tax policy continue 
to receive less attention, particularly equity and deeper governance concerns. 
Latin American governments contributed in the tax reform debate through the design and 
implementation of alternative and innovative tax reform projects. Tax policy innovations explored 
presumptive methods of taxation on income, taxation on financial transactions, and alternative methods 
of taxing property. They have also been framed to address particular features of the Latin American 
context, such as its large informal sector, dependence on foreign direct investment, and historical 
resistance to progressive taxation related to wealth inequality. Institutional innovations include new 
relationships between executive and legislature to overcome political stalemate and new links to society to 
generate a more inclusive and legitimate social contract. 
 
6.2 Outcomes 
Latin American tax reform during the 1990s resulted in progress in the area of tax administration and 
some policy reforms. Among the set of tax policy reform proposals advocated by the IFIs, three have 
been fairly consistently implemented: (a) reducing taxes on foreign trade; (b) lowering marginal rates on 
upper incomes for both individuals and businesses; and (c) simplifying income tax structures. 
However, these reforms have been incomplete in several dimensions. For example, reductions in 
high marginal rates of income tax rates on large taxable incomes have not been followed by a broadening 
of the income tax bases. Some of the implementation problems stem from the need to prioritise revenue-
raising to comply with fiscal adjustment programmes. In addition, political opposition blocked some 
reforms, and administrative incapacity made others impossible. The departure from more neutral and 
efficient taxes has been particularly apparent in the area of turnover and general sales taxes. VAT methods 
would have raised revenues more efficiently, but other taxes are administratively simpler to implement, 
raise more revenues, and are protected from vested interests.  
One of the main failures of the 1990s reforms has been in the area of distribution. Horizontal equity 
was largely excluded from consideration during the decade, and the regressive impact of many reforms is 
beginning to become apparent. Several other areas continued to be largely neglected, including taxation of 
land, small firms, agricultural products, and services. There has been also only limited emphasis on the use 
of tax policy to promote environmental protection. In addition, the design of revenue-sharing systems and 
the assignment of tax bases across different levels of government have only recently started to receive 
more detailed attention. 
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6.3 The politics of tax reform 
The politics of implementing tax reform are poorly understood and insufficiently taken into account in 
most reforms. Key interest groups may mobilise and institutional obstacles can present veto points that 
stall reforms. In addition, administrative incapacity may make some reforms unrealistic, even if they are 
otherwise sound. One result has been the reversal, partial dilution, and outright rejection of certain 
reforms. On the other hand, some innovative reforms have altered institutions to find a way around 
institutional or political obstacles, though the longer-term impacts are poorly understood.  
In addition, tax reform can have an independent, if unpredictable, impact on political development 
more broadly. Taxes shape the organisation and mobilisation of groups within society, and embody a 
social contract between state and society. Certain reforms have flourished by reinforcing this social 
contract and creating mechanisms of accountability that increase transparency in the use of resources. 
Nevertheless, an evaluation of reforms in terms of their political incidence is still lacking.  
 
6.4 Tax and the social contract 
In most parts of the world, and especially in Latin America, the tax relationship has the potential to firmly 
embed stable, civic and effective systems of democratic rule that effectively include the poor and 
disadvantaged. Although quite diverse, most of Latin America has long been characterised by an 
interlocking syndrome of (a) high economic, social and political inequality; (b) radical disagreement on 
political institutions and constitutions; and (c) the consequent difficulty of obtaining wide societal 
consensus over policies to deal with economic problems and crises, such that (d) economic problems can 
quickly deteriorate into deep, combined political and economic crises. While many factors can help break 
these vicious circles – and there has been much progress recently in many countries – taxation and tax 
policy are likely to lie close to the heart of the resolution process. Much of Latin America lacks an 
(implicit) social contract between governments and the general population of the kind that is embedded in 
taxation and fiscal principles and practices in politically more stable parts of the world.  
Fiscal and taxation issues tend to enter into public and electoral agendas in a muted and veiled 
fashion. Generally speaking, those who benefit in a relative sense from current arrangements – the under-
taxed rich – are successful in sidelining debate over distributional issues, and in preventing progressive 
reform in relation to taxation. Yet many of those same people are likely to benefit – and may be persuaded 
to perceive that they will benefit – from taxation systems that are more transparent and equitable, provide 
governments with more resources to address poverty, and command wider public understanding and 
legitimacy. The challenge is to stimulate and support those debates in a constructive fashion. Fortunately, 
the goal seems within reach. There are positive features to the current situation in Latin America. They 
include in particular:  
 
• The widespread recognition in government circles that taxation issues need to be addressed, and the 
fact that a great deal of reform is underway both in tax administration and in the re-shaping of the 
tax system. 
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• The fact that there is capacity and willingness in the region to experiment – often successfully – with 
a range of new taxes or tax practices that may be better adapted to the needs and circumstances of 
the region than some of the more formulaic approaches of the international financial institutions.  
 
6.5 Challenges 
The challenges facing Latin American tax systems in the next few years are to: 
 
1. Increase direct taxation, especially income taxes. 
2. Improve the administration of the VAT, broadening its base by including agricultural goods and 
services. 
3. Re-evaluate the assignment of tax bases and tax revenues among government levels in order to 
increase revenue mobilisation and tax effort at the local level, minimise interjurisdictional tax 
competition, and improve horizontal equity. 
4. Re-examine the distributive effects of the tax system. 
5. Rely more heavily on tax policy to address informal activities and environmental damage. 
6. Adjust tax policy and administration to the economic integration progress in order to promote 
economic competitiveness without compromising efficiency, equity and revenue-raising potential. 
7. Tie tax policy to citizen benefits, especially pro-poor expenditures and representation. 
8. Improve political institutions in ways that broaden and deepen social contracts. For example, create 
more responsive and less clientelistic political parties, more cohesive and less polarised party systems, 
and improved capacity of civil society to monitor government and participate in tax debates. 
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